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Articles
Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s
First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis
Anita S. Krishnakumar*
This Article examines the Roberts Court’s statutory cases from its 2005–2008 Terms,
beginning with cases decided after January 31, 2006, when Justice Alito joined the Court,
and concluding with cases decided on June 29, 2009, when Justice Souter retired. The
Article’s approach is both empirical and doctrinal, in that it (1) presents descriptive
statistics illustrating the Court’s and individual Justices’ rates of reliance on fourteen
different tools of statutory construction, and (2) engages in doctrinal analysis of the
Court’s statutory cases, highlighting discernable patterns in the individual Justices’
interpretive approaches. The Article makes two significant contributions to the field of
statutory interpretation. First, it identifies an interpretive divide that seems to be doing
significant work in the Roberts Court’s statutory cases—a divide that perhaps best can be
described as one between “legal-landscape coherence” on the one hand, and “statutespecific coherence” on the other. “Legal-landscape coherence” refers to an interpretive
approach that focuses on the legal framework surrounding the statute at issue and seeks
the statutory construction that fits most coherently into the existing legal structure; while
“statute-specific coherence” refers to an interpretive approach that focuses on the
individual statute at issue and preferences the statutory construction that creates an
internally consistent and coherent policy across like situations and across time. The
Article maps out the Justices’ theoretical divide in detail and shows how the divide
translates into stark empirical differences in the Justices’ individual rates of reliance on
particular interpretive canons and tools.
This Article breaks new ground by uncovering an important difference in the form of
practical considerations that different Justices tend to reference. Specifically, the Article
demonstrates that the landscape-coherence Justices tend to focus on the administrability
of an interpretation—that is, its effect on judicial resources, the difficulty of implementing
it, and the clarity and predictability of the rule created; while the statute-specific Justices
tend to focus on the constancy of the policy effected by an interpretation—for instance,
whether it fosters a consistent application of the statute over time, the arbitrariness of the
policy created, and the justness of the interpretation. The Article concludes with two case
studies illustrating how the Roberts Court’s interpretive divide operates in practice and
with a discussion about the theoretical implications of the divide.
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Introduction
Scholarly literature in the field of statutory interpretation long has
tended towards the theoretical. The academic annals are rife with
forceful, often heated, debate about the most legitimate approach to
interpreting statutes, as well as bald assertions about the value or
1
indeterminacy of particular interpretive canons and methodologies. In

1. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 16–37 (1997) (advocating a textualist approach and
denouncing the resort to legislative history or substantive policy norms in interpreting statutes); see
also J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 743, 772–73 (1987)
(describing originalism as the preferred method of statutory interpretation for most judges and
lawyers); Stephen Breyer, On The Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 845, 847 (1992) (defending legislative history use as legitimate); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role
of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 59, 62 (1988) (“[O]riginal intent
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the early years following Justice Scalia’s ascension to the Supreme Court,
2
it was particularly in vogue to argue the merits of “textualism” versus
3
“intentionalism” and to observe that the Court had become more textfocused and correspondingly less inclined to rely on legislative history in
4
interpreting statutes. Until recently, almost no empirical measurements
had been conducted to test such assertions.
In the last decade-and-a-half, a few empirical studies of the Supreme
Court’s statutory interpretation cases have emerged. These studies have
ranged in scope, measuring various aspects of the Court’s interpretive
methodology—from the use of canons of construction in workplace law
5
6
cases, to the rise and fall of the Court’s reliance on legislative history, to

rather than an objective inquiry . . . increases the discretion, and therefore the power, of the court.”);
William D. Popkin, An ‘Internal’ Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76
Minn. L. Rev. 1133, 1138 (1992) (offering a critical look at “Justice Scalia’s text- and rule-based
approach” to interpreting statutes); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 383, 383–84 (1992) (“I construct a
second theory, ‘law as a statute.’ . . . [This will] provide a principled and effective constraint on the use
of legislative history.”); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987
Duke L.J. 371, 377 (criticizing legislative history use).
2. Textualism is an interpretive philosophy that prioritizes the statute’s text above all else.
Proponents of this approach urge courts to resolve statutory cases solely with reference to the written
text and discourage consultation of non-textual sources such as legislative history. See, e.g., Scalia,
supra note 1, at 16–37; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the
Judiciary, 7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 87, 89–94 (1984); John F. Manning, Competing Presumption
About Statutory Coherence, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2009, 2027 (2006).
3. Intentionalism instructs courts to resolve interpretive questions in statutory cases by asking
how the enacting Congress would have decided the question. Intentionalism invites substantial
reliance on legislative history and other interpretive tools indicative of the enacting Congress’s desires.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 286–87 (1985) (“[T]he judge
should try to put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators and figure out how they would have
wanted the statute applied to the case before him.”); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Colum.
L. Rev. 379, 381 (1907) (“The object of genuine interpretation is to discover the rule which the lawmaker intended to establish; to discover the intention with which the law-maker made the rule, or the
sense which he attached to the words wherein the rule is expressed.”).
4. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 623–25 (1990)
(“[N]ew textualism posits that once the Court has ascertained a statute’s plain meaning, consideration
of legislative history becomes irrelevant.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the
Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 355–57 (1994) (finding an increase in “textualism” and a
corresponding decline in the Court’s use of legislative history between 1981 and 1992); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in
the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 750–52 (1995) (criticizing the Court’s overuse of
textualism); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 231, 246 (“[P]lain language discourse dominates the Court’s statutory
interpretation cases.”).
5. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for
Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 15 (2005).
6. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 Judicature 220, 222 (2006)
(finding a higher rate of legislative history use, between 40% and 50%, in the period from 1969 to
1986, with a drop off to 25% from 1986 to 2002); Merrill, supra note 4, at 355 (finding that use of
legislative history had fallen to 18% by the 1992 Term); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The
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the Court’s patterns of deference to administrative agencies, to the
frequency of the Court’s references to all interpretive tools in all
8
statutory cases decided in one Term, to the alignment between the
Court’s use of interpretive tools and the most prominent theoretical
9
approaches—textualism, intentionalism, dynamic updating, or pragmatism.
This Article takes a slightly different approach, examining the
Roberts Court’s reliance on the canons and other interpretive tools in all
of its statutory cases from January 31, 2006, when Justice Alito joined the
Court, to June 29, 2009, Justice Souter’s last day on the bench. My study
differs from earlier empirical studies in a few significant respects. First,
its data is culled from all of the cases decided by one particular Court—
the Roberts Court—rather than from a sampling of cases from various
Terms and Courts. Second, it focuses not on measuring changes in the
Court’s use of particular canons or interpretive tools over time, but on
patterns and groupings of different Justices’ preferences for particular
interpretive tools, and what these patterns reveal about the Justices’
goals in interpreting statutes. The Article, therefore, takes a combined
empirical and doctrinal approach, relying on both descriptive statistics
and doctrinal analysis of the Court’s opinions to paint a nuanced portrait
of the Justices’ methodological points of departure in statutory cases.
In the end, this Article reaches three conclusions. First, the data
from the Roberts Court’s first era of statutory interpretation cases is
consistent with Jane Schacter’s theory that the Supreme Court interprets
10
statutes in a manner she dubbed “common law originalism.” Based on
empirical observations of forty-eight statutory cases decided during the
Court’s 1996 Term, Schacter has argued that the Court’s interpretive
methodology is part “originalist,” in that it involves significant reliance
on statutory language as an “interpretive anchor,” and part “common
law,” in that the Court draws from a number of judicially created

Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 277, 280, 287–88 (1990) (finding that the Court used legislative history in
almost every statutory interpretation case in the 1981 Term, with the rate declining to 75% for the
1988–1989 Term); see also David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1653, 1683–84 (2010) (tracking, inter alia,
the Court’s rate of legislative history use from 1953 to 2006).
7. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L.J. 1083, 1098
(2008).
8. See Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev.
1, 4 (1998).
9. See Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 136–37, 143–48
(2009); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis,
70 Tex. L. Rev. 1073, 1074–76 (1992).
10. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 5.
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resources to choose between plausible statutory constructions. Data
12
from the Roberts Court’s first three-and-a-half Terms supports this
characterization, demonstrating substantial judicial reliance on originalist
sources, such as statutory language and structure, as well as on common
law sources, such as prior judicial interpretations and judicial
13
observations about the practical consequences likely to result from
certain interpretations.
Second, the data also suggest that Schacter’s common law
originalism theory paints an incomplete picture of the Supreme Court’s
interpretive methodology in statutory cases. Something more nuanced
than simple, across-the-board common law judging, tempered by
attention to the text appears to be taking place beneath the surface in
several of the cases. My analysis of canon and interpretive tool reliance
in majority versus dissenting opinions and of the individual Justices’ rates
of reliance on particular canons and interpretive tools suggests that,
while all of the Justices seek to make sense of statutes they interpret, the
individual members of the Court possess different points of departure for
what the relevant “sense” is.
In my observation, there are two principle camps, or schools of
thought, reflected in the Roberts Court’s opinions with respect to what
kind of “sense” a judicial interpreter should strive to make of the statute
before her. The first camp seems to regard the relevant “sense” with
reference to the larger legal landscape. Doctrinally, members of this
camp tend to justify their interpretations as necessary to make a statutory
provision fit coherently into the existing legal framework, like a piece in
a puzzle. These Justices focus not only on the statute at issue, but also,
and sometimes more so, on the puzzle pieces (related legal rules) already
in place, such as the entire United States Code (all federal statutes), prior
judicial interpretations of similar statutes, the Constitution and
background norms derived from it, and the common law rule in the
relevant field. Empirically and methodologically, the Justices in this
camp exhibit a measurable preference for interpretive tools that foster
consistency with the overarching legal landscape, including other statutes
with similar language, Supreme Court precedents interpreting similar
14
statutory provisions, substantive canons of construction reflecting

11. Id.
12. The study includes cases from the second half of the Court’s 2005 Term (following Justice
Alito’s ascension to the bench at the end of January, 2006) and from the full 2006, 2007, and 2008
Terms.
13. Schacter calls this latter interpretive resource “judicially-selected policy norms.” Schacter,
supra note 8, at 5, 12.
14. Substantive canons reflect a judicially preferred policy position. They are not predicated on
presumptions about what the words of a statute should mean, but instead reflect judicial rules of
thumb about how to treat statutory text in light of constitutional priorities, pre-enactment common
law practices, or specific statutorily-based policies. See infra pages 243–44 for a detailed explanation
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background constitutional or policy norms, generally applicable
dictionary definitions and meanings of words, and common law
15
precedents in the relevant field. The Justices in this camp also pay
significant attention to the practical consequences likely to result from a
particular interpretation, to ensure that the rule announced in the instant
case does not create an unworkable rupture in the overarching legal
landscape.
The second camp, which finds itself in dissent more often than the
first, is less focused on the legal landscape and more focused on the
policy embodied in the particular statute before the Court. Its members
seem to consider it their primary interpretive goal to “make sense” of
Congress’s handiwork in the individual statute at issue. This camp, while
not inattentive to legal landscape concerns, places greater interpretive
weight on canons and interpretive tools that focus on the statute at hand
and that foster consistent and coherent fulfillment of the individual
statute’s provisions. Empirically, Justices in this camp exhibit a higher
degree of reliance on statutory purpose, inferences regarding
16
congressional intent, and legislative history than do the Justices who fall
into Camp One. Like the Camp One Justices, they also pay attention to
the practical consequences likely to result from a particular
interpretation, but with an eye towards ensuring an internally consistent
and coherent statutory policy. This is not to say that Camp Two Justices
do not rely on Supreme Court precedent, other statutes, or the other
preferred tools of Camp One Justices—but merely that they rely less
frequently on such landscape-oriented tools than they do on the statutespecific coherence-promoting tools described above. Doctrinally, Camp
Two Justices tend to lead with the statute-specific oriented canons and
interpretive tools and to emphasize the importance of maintaining a
consistent statutory policy over time.
Third, while it is no longer novel to observe that Supreme Court
Justices frequently reference the practical consequences of particular
17
statutory constructions, this Article’s empirically-informed doctrinal
analysis suggests that the two camps vary markedly in the form of
practical consequences to which they tend to give weight when
construing statutes. That is, the Camp One Justices tend to focus on
administrability concerns, such as the effect on judicial resources, clarity,
and predictability created by an interpretation; whereas, the Camp Two
Justices tend to focus on concerns about policy constancy, including
whether the interpretation maintains a consistent statutory policy over
and examples of different kinds of substantive canons.
15. Each of these interpretive tools is explained in detail infra page 241–45.
16. Each of these interpretive resources is examined in detail infra pages 245–46.
17. See discussion infra Part I and accompanying notes (discussing Zeppos’s and Schacter’s
findings in previous studies).
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time, the arbitrariness or incoherence of the policy created by the
interpretation, and the fairness of the interpretation.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews four of the most recent
empirical studies of the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases.
Part II presents data about the individual Justices’ relative rates of
reliance on different interpretive tools in the opinions they authored,
mapping out in detail the Justices’ interpretive and methodological
divide over legal-landscape versus statute-specific coherence. Part III
examines case studies from the Roberts Court’s last three-and-a-half
Terms that doctrinally illustrate how the coherence divide operates in
practice. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the differences between
statute-specific coherence, purposivism, and intentionalism and with
observations about the ideological implications of the coherence divide.

I. What We Know So Far: Previous Empirical Studies of
Statutory Interpretation
A handful of empirical studies of Supreme Court statutory
interpretation cases have been conducted to date. These studies variously
have concluded that the Court’s rate of reliance on canons of
construction has increased over time, while its use of legislative history
18
has declined; the Court’s use of legislative history is experiencing a
19
“resurgence” ; the Court has become more textualist and less willing to
20
rely on legislative history; the Court rarely references the Chevron test
and uses ad hoc judicial reasoning when deciding whether to defer to
21
agency interpretations; and the Court’s approach to statutory
interpretation does not match up neatly with any of the prevailing
22
theories of statutory interpretation. Some of the studies have noted the
Court’s open reliance on pragmatic considerations in construing
23
statutes. A few have characterized the Court’s approach to statutory
24
interpretation as “eclectic” or “pluralis[t],” concluding that the Justices
seem willing to use whatever interpretive tool they deem best suited to
the case at hand—relying on legislative history in one case, statutory text
and the dictionary in the next, and pragmatic policy concerns in a third.
This Part briefly reviews the major findings of four recent empirical
studies of relatively broad scope, that is, studies that measured the
Court’s reliance on a variety of interpretive tools, rather than focusing on

18. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 35.
19. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 5.
20. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 355.
21. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 7, at 1090.
22. See Cross, supra note 9, at 144–46; Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1106.
23. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 9, at 147–48; Schacter, supra note 8, at 21; Zeppos, supra note 9, at
1107–08.
24. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 9, at 157; Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1119 (“eclectic”).
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just one tool, such as legislative history or deference to agency
interpretations.
In one of the first empirical studies of the Supreme Court’s statutory
interpretation cases, Nicholas Zeppos sought to measure the Court’s
existing practice against several prevailing theories about how statutes
25
should be construed. After measuring the Court’s citations to a wide
range of authorities in a random sample of 413 cases decided between
1890 and 1990, Zeppos concluded that although the Court made frequent
26
27
28
references to legislative sources, including text and legislative history,
the Court’s methodology could not be described as either predominantly
29
“originalist” or “textualist,” because it relied on neither textual nor
originalist sources in a significant percentage of cases and, conversely,
30
often relied on both textual and nontextual sources in the same case.
Zeppos further observed that the Court referenced “consequentialist or
31
practical considerations” in 28% of the cases studied and argued that
this suggested the Court was far more “dynamic” in its interpretive
32
approach than scholars had realized.
Schacter’s empirical study of the Court’s 1996 Term has been
discussed in some detail above. Like Zeppos, Schacter found striking the
Court’s reliance on what she termed “judicially-selected policy norms,”
reflecting pragmatic and consequentialist concerns about the likely
33
results of a particular interpretation. Schacter’s “judicially-selected
policy norms” seem to measure the same types of references as Zeppos’s
“consequentialist or practical considerations”—that is, references to
desirable or adverse policy consequences likely to flow from a particular
interpretation, or arguments that a particular interpretation will produce
results that undermine important public values. But Schacter found a
remarkably high rate of reference to such policy norms—73%—in her

25. Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1076–88 .
26. Zeppos grouped all of the sources of authority cited by the Court into six larger categories:
(1) legislative, (2) executive, (3) judicial, (4) constitutional, (5) canons of interpretation, and (6) other.
Id. at 1089.
27. Id. at 1093 (reporting that 84% of cases studied referenced the statute’s text).
28. Id. (reporting that congressional reports are cited in 32% of the cases studied, debates in
16.9% of cases studied, and hearing material in 12.6% of the cases studied).
29. Zeppos used the term “originalism” rather than “intentionalism” to describe the interpretive
philosophy that focuses on fulfilling the enacting of Congress’s intent. See id. at 1078.
30. See id. at 1118–20.
31. Id. at 1097.
32. See id. at 1107–08. Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation focus on the public values or
practical consequences of an interpretation, urging courts to construe statutes in a manner that is
responsive to current, real-world societal needs. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1479 (1987) (“Statutes . . . should . . . be interpreted ‘dynamically,’
that is, in light of their present societal, political, and legal context.”).
33. See Schacter, supra note 8, at 5, 12, 18, 21.
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34

dataset. It is difficult to determine whether the difference between the
studies results from different coding criteria, from the larger sample size
of Zeppos’s study, or from differences in Court composition during the
time frame of the two studies. All three factors are likely at play, but the
important point is that both studies found a significant rate of reliance on
35
consequentialist considerations in the Court’s interpretive methodology.
As discussed in greater detail in Part II.B, my study of the Roberts
Court’s statutory cases similarly found references to practical
36
consequences in a significant percentage of the cases. Schacter also
37
and
found significant judicial reliance on legislative history
38
congressional intent, and comparatively little reliance on dictionaries.
More recently, Frank Cross examined a sample of 120 cases from
39
the Court’s 1994 through 2002 Terms. Cross’s aim was to measure the
Court’s and individual Justices’ patterns of canon usage for consistency
with the different theoretical approaches, as well as to test the various
interpretive
methodologies’
ability
to
constrain
ideological
40
decisionmaking. He coded for judicial reliance on several specific
canons and interpretive tools and then grouped these canons and tools
into four categories corresponding to the predominant interpretive
41
theories: Intentionalism, Textualism, Canons, and Pragmatism. Cross’s
study, like Zeppos’s, found significant reliance on both textual and
intent-focused sources, reporting that a majority of cases made some
positive use of at least one tool of legislative intent, as well as some
42
reference to statutory text. His study found “much less” reliance on
43
pragmatic or practical considerations, and still less reliance on the
44
canons of construction (10% of cases studied). Finally, with respect to
ideology, Cross’s study found that the use of textualist tools showed no
constraining effect on the liberal or conservative outcome of a ruling, but

34. See id. at 18 tbl.I.
35. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 465 (1990) (“Law as currently
conceived . . . [places] too much emphasis on authority, certitude, rhetoric, and tradition, [and] too
little on consequences and on social-scientific techniques for measuring consequences.”).
36. See infra Table 1 (in half of the cases studied, the majority, concurring, and/or dissenting
opinions referenced the practical consequences of an interpretation).
37. Schacter, supra note 8, at 16, 18 tbl.1 (showing legislative history referenced in 49% of cases
studied).
38. Id. at 14 (showing congressional intent referenced in 53% of cases studied, and dictionaries
referenced in only 18% of cases studied).
39. See Cross, supra note 9, at 142–43; Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive
Methodologies, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1971, 1981 (2007).
40. Cross, supra note 9, at 143, 164.
41. Id. at 143–44.
42. Id. at 144, 146.
43. Id. at 147.
44. Id. at 146.
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that reliance on legislative intent and pragmatism pushed outcomes in a
45
liberal direction.
In a slightly different vein, James Brudney and Corey Ditslear
studied the Supreme Court’s use of the canons of construction in every
46
workplace law case decided from 1969 to 2003. Brudney and Ditslear’s
focus was on measuring the extent to which the canons operate as neutral
rules constraining the Justices’ ability to interpret statutes based on
47
ideological preferences. Brudney and Ditslear coded for judicial
reliance on a number of interpretive sources, including language canons,
which they defined to include grammar and linguistic canons, as well as
48
the whole act rule, and substantive canons, defined as presumptions
based on constitutional and common law norms about how statutes
49
should be interpreted, and found, inter alia, that the Justices tend to use
the canons to reinforce their ideological predispositions, with liberal
Justices referencing the canons to reach liberal outcomes and
conservative Justices referencing the canons to reach conservative
50
outcomes. Brudney and Ditslear also found that the Court’s use of
legislative history as an interpretive tool declined significantly from the
Burger Court to the Rehnquist Court, falling from an average rate of
reference of 42.1% between 1984 and 1988, to somewhere between 22
51
and 25% from 1989 to 2003.
In sum, previous empirical studies have taught that the Court relies
significantly on statutory text, as well as legislative intent and legislative
history in interpreting statutes, although its rate of reliance on legislative
history seems to have fluctuated over time. The studies also indicate that
the Court references practical considerations, focusing on the
consequences that an interpretation will produce, in a substantial
percentage of statutory cases.

II. The Roberts Court, 2005–2008 Terms: Empirical Findings
This Part presents the data found in my examination of the Roberts
Court’s first era statutory interpretation cases. Part II.A explains the
methodology used to gather and evaluate the Court’s statutory cases.
Part II.B provides an overview of the data on the Justices’ interpretive
45. Id. at 176.
46. See Brudney & Ditslear, Canons, supra note 5, at 5.
47. Id. at 4.
48. See E-mail from James J. Brudney, Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Professor of Law,
Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law (Feb. 27, 2008, 10:46 EST) (on file with author). Language
canons are based on grammar rules and the arrangement of words or phrases within a statute, while
the whole act rule is based on how the different sections of a statute fit together. Eskridge et al., infra
note 102, at 862; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 12.
49. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 5 & n.16.
50. See id. at 6.
51. See id. at 35.
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practices. And Part II.C presents both detailed data and doctrinal
analysis demonstrating the Court’s coherence divide.
A. Methodology
The findings and conclusions presented below are based on
empirical and doctrinal analysis of all decisions in the Roberts Court’s
2005 (post-January 31, 2006) through 2008 Terms that confronted a
question of statutory interpretation. Every case decided during that time
frame was examined through the Supreme Court’s online database to
determine whether it dealt with a statutory issue. Any case in which the
Court’s opinion contained a substantial discussion about statutory
meaning was included in the study. Cases interpreting the Federal Rules
52
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) were not included, but a handful of
constitutional cases in which the Court was required to construe a federal
statute before deciding the constitutional question were included. This
selection methodology yielded 166 statutory cases over three and a half
Terms, with 166 majority or plurality opinions, 65 concurring opinions,
110 dissenting opinions, 9 part concurring/part dissenting opinions, and 2
53
part majority/part concurring opinions, for a total of 352 opinions.
In analyzing these cases and opinions, my primary goal was to
determine the frequency with which the Court referenced a range of
interpretive sources when giving meaning to federal statutes. The cases
in the study were examined for references to the following interpretive
tools: (1) the statutory language of the provision at issue, including
appeals to plain or ordinary meaning; (2) dictionary definitions; (3) a
grammar-based canon or rule; (4) the whole act rule (inferences based on
other sections of the same statute); (5) other statutes, including federal
and sometimes state; (6) common law precedent; (7) substantive canons
(for example, the rule of lenity and the canon of constitutional
avoidance); (8) deference to agency interpretations; (9) Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the same or related statutes; (10) statutory

52. I made this judgment call because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are created in a
manner that differs significantly from federal statutes. Whereas federal statutes are enacted into law
by both houses of Congress and the President pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution; the
FRCP are promulgated by the judicial branch, with minimal review by Congress, and do not require
the President’s approval. Thus, several of the interpretive tools available when construing statutes
either are not available with respect to the FRCP or provide a very different kind of context, from a
very different perspective, when used to construe the FRCP—including legislative history, intent,
other statutes, and text. See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess:
Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 587, 618 (2009); Natasha Dasani,
Class Actions and the Interpretation of Monetary Damages Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(B)(2), 75 Fordham L. Rev. 165, 194–95 (2006); Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1100–02 (2002).
53. For a list of the cases examined in the study—and the statutes they interpreted—see
Appendix A, on file with the Hastings Law Journal.
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purpose; (11) practical consequences; (12) legislative intent; (13)
legislative history (including references to committee reports, floor
debates, hearings, and a statute’s evolution); and (14) language canons
54
such as noscitur a sociis and expressio unius.
These fourteen interpretive sources are consistent with those
examined in previous empirical studies. A few differences in definitions
used for the different sources were inevitable and will be pointed out
where notable. First, unlike the Brudney and Ditslear study, which
grouped together several interpretive tools under the heading “language
canons,” I counted separately any references to grammar canons,
linguistic canons, and the whole act rule. Second, I recorded as a
reference to “practical consequences” any reliance on the absurdity of a
result, the administrative or other burdens caused by an interpretation,
the justness or fairness of an interpretation, the interpretation’s
consistency with the policy of the statute, or other practical consequences
expected to be produced by an interpretation.
In recording the Court’s reliance on these interpretive tools, I
counted only references that reflected substantive judicial reliance on the
tool in reaching an interpretation. Instances in which the Court
considered an interpretive tool but rejected it as unconvincing were not
counted, nor were instances in which the Court merely acknowledged,
but did not accept, a litigant’s argument that a particular canon or tool
dictated a particular result. An example may help illustrate. In Watson v.
United States, Justice Souter’s majority opinion relied on the plain
meaning of the word “use” in the firearms enhancement statute, along
55
with several corroborative dictionary definitions to hold that a person
who trades his drugs in exchange for a gun does not “use” a firearm
56
“during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime.” Justice
Souter’s opinion also rejected the government’s practical consequences
argument that it would be asymmetrical for the criminal law to penalize a
person who trades his gun for drugs, which was previously ruled to
constitute “use” under the same statutory provision, but not to penalize
57
the person on the other end of the exchange who receives the gun. The
opinion was coded for reliance on text/plain meaning and the dictionary
rule, but not for reliance on practical consequences.
Secondary or corroborative references to an interpretive tool, on
the other hand, were counted; thus, where the Court reached an

54. In order to reduce the risk of inconsistency, I, along with at least one research assistant,
separately read and analyzed each opinion, and separately recorded the use of each interpretive
resource. In the event of a disagreement, I reviewed and reconsidered the case and made the final
determination as to how a particular interpretive resource should be coded.
55. 552 U.S. 74, 79–80 & n.7 (2007).
56. Id. at 76 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 81–82.
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interpretation based primarily on one interpretive source but then went
on to note that x, y, and z interpretive tools further supported that
interpretation, the references to x, y, and z were coded along with the
other sources. Again, an example may prove helpful. In Dean v. United
58
States, Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion argued that a sentencing
59
enhancement triggered when a “firearm is discharged” should be read
to apply only when the defendant intended to discharge the gun, and not
in cases where the gun accidentally discharged during commission of the
60
crime. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens relied principally on
whole-act-rule-based arguments about the structure of the sentencing
61
enhancement provision, combined with legislative history and intent
62
arguments which emphasized that Congress had amended the
enhancement provision in response to the Court’s previous
63
interpretation of the statute in Bailey v. United States. Justice Stevens
went on to argue that even if the enhancement provision’s structure and
history had not clearly pointed to the conclusion that it applies only to
intentional discharges, common law presumptions about mens rea,
Supreme Court precedent, presumptions of an intent requirement in
other criminal statutes, the rule of lenity, and practical concerns about
64
inequitable application of the enhancement provision all dictated the
65
same interpretive outcome. The opinion was coded for references to the
whole act rule, legislative history, legislative intent, common law
precedent, Supreme Court precedent, other statutes, substantive canons
such as the rule of lenity, and practical consequences.
In addition, the vote margin in each case was recorded, and each
case and opinion was recorded as unanimous, close margin (5–4, 5–3, 4–
1–4, or 5–2 where two Justices were non-participating), or wide margin
(cases with six or more Justices in the majority). Each Justice’s vote in
each case also was recorded, as were the authors of each opinion.

58. 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
60. Dean, 129 S. Ct. at 1856 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1857.
62. Id.
63. 516 U. S. 137, 148 (1995).
64. Specifically, Justice Stevens’s dissent argued that the majority’s interpretation of the
enhancement provision would impose a harsher penalty for an act caused not by an “evil-meaning
mind,” but by a clumsy hand (that is, accidental discharge of a gun) than it would for an act caused by
both an “evil-meaning mind” and an “evil-doing hand” (that is, brandishing a gun with an intent to
intimidate). 129 S. Ct. at 1859 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952)).
65. Id. at 1857–59 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 605–06 (1994); United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422 (1978); Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251–52).
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B. Overview
Before presenting the data, a few caveats are in order. First, my
study covers only three and a half Supreme Court Terms and only 166
statutory interpretation cases, decided by one set of the same nine
Justices. Given the size of the dataset, great significance should not be
placed on the precise percentages reported for the frequency with which
the members of the Court relied on particular interpretive tools during
this era. The number of cases reviewed in this study is large enough to
provide some valuable broad-brushstroke insights, but the focus should
be on the patterns that emerge, rather than on minute differences in the
percentages reported. Second, although I suggest that the Justices fall
into two basic interpretive camps, with some overlap, I make no claims to
have discovered the Justices’ underlying, or “true,” motivations for
deciding statutory cases; my empirical and doctrinal claims are confined
to describing how the Justices publicly justify their statutory
interpretations and to theorizing about discernable patterns in the kinds
of public justifications they regularly provide. Third, I have not
attempted to prioritize or empirically account for the weight that the
Court gives to different interpretive tools in each case. Although the
Court sometimes places great weight on certain interpretive tools and
references others only for corroboration, ranking its relative reliance on
such tools requires subjective judgments and is likely to produce
66
unreliable empirical results, so I avoided it.
Fourth, while most of the coding performed in this study involved
simple binary observations of whether a particular interpretive source
was referenced or not, some of the coding required nuanced
classifications of legal arguments—most notably, the coding identifying
which form of practical consequences the Court was referencing. The use
of such nuanced classifications may pose replicability issues, but it added
a valuable dimension that was largely lacking in previous studies of the
67
Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation methodology. In any event,

66. The exception is for legislative history. In addition to a variable that coded “yes” or “no” for
legislative history usage, I also created a separate variable that coded for use of legislative history to
“corroborate” an interpretation arrived at through other tools versus substantial “reliance” on
legislative history to construe a statute. See infra Codebook.
67. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 Perspectives on Pol. 261, 266–67 (2006)
(criticizing much of the political science literature for, inter alia, focusing on the analysis of bare
outcomes in lieu of the content of opinions); Kirk A. Randazzo et al., Checking the Federal Courts:
The Impact of Congressional Statutes on Judicial Behavior, 68 J. Pol. 1006, 1008 (2006) (noting the
lack of empirical studies that attempt to examine the impact of “traditional legal concepts” on judicial
behavior); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies
of Judicial Decision Making, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 884–86 (2008) (reviewing Frank B. Cross,
Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2007)) (“[T]he law necessitates [empirical
studies] . . . examining and classifying the content of judicial opinions rather than merely counting
outcomes in cases.”).
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the practical-consequences data and classifications are available for
others to review and to agree or disagree with.
Table 1 lists the frequency with which the Roberts Court relied on
various interpretive tools in its majority, dissenting, and concurring
opinions, as well as the Court’s overall rates of reliance on these sources
in the 166 cases decided and the 352 opinions issued between the date
Justice Alito joined the Court and the date Justice Souter retired. For
each interpretive resource, Table 1 reports reliance as a percentage of
the total number of cases, majority opinions, dissenting opinions,
concurring opinions, and total opinions. The data demonstrate some
unsurprising results, as well as some less expected ones. Unsurprisingly,
the text/plain meaning of the statute and Supreme Court precedent were
the most frequently relied upon interpretive resources, irrespective of
opinion type. The Court’s significant reliance on its own interpretive
precedents hardly is unexpected, as it reflects the application of
traditional decisionmaking tools to the statutory context and may be
68
driven at least in part by a need to legitimate the Court’s interpretation.
Further, a high rate of reliance on the Court’s own precedents is entirely
69
consistent with the empirical findings in the studies discussed in Part I.
The frequency of the Court’s references to statutory text, likewise, is
consistent with findings in prior empirical studies and suggests judicial
sensitivity to the legal legitimacy interests achieved by grounding its
70
construction in the language of the statute at issue.

68. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of
Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 489, 509 (finding that the need to legitimate the
Court’s rulings is a significant factor contributing to its citation of precedent); James H. Fowler &
Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 Soc. Networks 16, 16 (2008) (arguing
that given the judiciary’s political weakness and inability to implement its rulings, judicial power is
limited by its perceived authority in our governmental system—a fact which puts pressure on the
Court to justify its decisions with reference to stable legal standards, such as stare decisis).
69. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 30 (finding reliance on Supreme Court
precedent in 82.8% of cases studied); Schacter, supra note 8, at 18 (finding reliance on Supreme Court
or other precedent in 100% of majority opinions of cases studied).
70. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 9, at 146; Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 30; Schacter, supra
note 8, at 18; Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1092–93.
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Table 1: Overall Roberts Court Rates of Reliance on Interpretive
71
Canons and Tools
All
Cases†
(n = 166)

Majority
Opinions
(n = 166)

Dissenting
Opinions
(n = 110)

Concurring
Opinions
(n = 65)

All
Opinions‡
(n = 352)

Text/Plain
Meaning*
(p = .015)

67.5%

55.4%

40.9%

33.8%

46.3%

Dictionary Rule**
(p = .003)

29.5%

27.1%

11.8%

7.7%

18.5%

Grammar Canons

10.2%

7.8%

3.8%

1.6%

5.1%

Linguistic Canons
Language Canons
(Grammar +
Linguistic)
Other Statutes*
(p = .024)
Common Law
Precedent*
(p = .018)
Substantive
Canons
Whole Act Rule*
(p = .016)

11.4%

7.8%

4.5%

1.6%

5.4%

19.9%

15.1%

7.3%

3.1%

9.9%

39.2%

33.7%

21.8%

7.7%

24.4%

17.3%

13.3%

4.8%

7.7%

9.4%

28.9%

18.7%

18.2%

4.6%

15.3%

45.2%

36.8%

22.7%

7.7%

26.7%

Agency Deference
Supreme Court
Precedent
Practical
Consequences
Purpose

14.5%

9.0%

7.3%

3.1%

8.2%

65.0%

57.2%

46.4%

29.2%

47.7%

51.8%

36.1%

38.2%

20.0%

33.2%

41.0%

29.5%

27.3%

10.8%

25.0%

Intent** (p = .005)

33.1%

16.9%

30.9%

9.2%

19.3%

Legislative History

37.9%

26.5%

28.2%

6.2%

23.0%

Canons/
Interpretive Tools

71. * Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between rates of reliance in
Majority and Dissenting Opinions at p < .05. (For Text/Plain Meaning p = .015; for Other Statutes
p = .024; for Common Law Precedent p = .018; and for Whole Act Rule p = .016).
** Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between rates of reliance in
Majority and Dissenting Opinions at p < .01. (For Dictionary Rule p = .003 and for Intent p = .005).
† Percentages reported in this column for Practical Consequences, Legislative History, and
Whole Act Rule include 2– 3 part concurring/dissenting or part majority/concurring opinions not listed
separately in the Table. The effect of these additional opinions on the percentages reported is
minimal, at 1%.
‡ Percentages reported in this column for Text or Plain Meaning, Dictionary Rule, Agency
Deference, Supreme Court Precedent, Practical Consequences, Legislative History, and Whole Act
Rule include 2–3 part concurring/dissenting or part majority/concurring opinions not listed separately
in the Table. The effect of these additional opinions on the percentages reported is minimal (less than
1%).
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The next most-frequently referenced interpretive tools in cases in
which at least one opinion references the interpretive resource are
practical consequences and the whole act rule, followed by other statutes,
purpose, and legislative history. Legislative intent also is referenced in a
substantial percentage of the Court’s statutory cases, though at a
somewhat lower rate than the other most-frequently referenced
interpretive sources. Of the cases in which at least one opinion references
legislative history, 60.9% of the references are to committee reports,
31.3% are to the statute’s evolution over time, 15.6% are to floor
statements or debates, 9.4% are to hearings, 7.8% are to the absence of
72
legislative history and the “dog that did not bark canon,” and 9.4% are
to other types of legislative history, such as rejected legislative proposals
or the identity of the statute’s drafter or the drafter’s non-legislative
73
statements. This hierarchy of legislative history sources, from mostfrequently to least-frequently referenced, is roughly consistent with prior
74
empirical studies.
When references to different interpretive tools in majority versus
dissenting opinions are compared, however, a striking pattern emerges.
Some interpretive tools were referenced with significantly greater
frequency in dissenting opinions, while others were referenced far more
frequently in majority opinions. For example, legislative intent was
referenced in only 16.9% of the majority opinions studied, but was
referenced at almost twice that rate in dissenting opinions (31%).
72. The canon is named after a famous Sherlock Holmes story, Silver Blaze, in which the fact that
the dog did not bark while a racehorse was being stolen led the detective to deduce that the thief was
someone the dog knew. See Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 1 Sherlock Holmes: The
Complete Novels and Stories 455, 475 (Bantam Books 1986) (1892). The canon holds that where the
legislative history is silent, courts should not presume that Congress intended to work drastic changes
in a law—on the theory that if drastic changes were intended, some legislator would have “barked”
and highlighted the change somewhere in the legislative history. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 396 (1991) (“We reject that construction because we are convinced that if Congress had such an
intent, Congress would have made it explicit in the statute, or at least some of the Members would
have identified or mentioned it at some point in the unusually extensive legislative history of the 1982
amendment.”); id. 396 n.23 (“Congress’ silence in this regard can be likened to the dog that did not
bark.” (citing Doyle, supra)).
73. There were 64 cases and 81 opinions that referenced one or more kinds of legislative history.
A number of these cases and opinions cited more than one kind of legislative history. The percentages
provided above reflect the proportion of cases (out of 64) in which the different kinds of legislative
history were cited. The percentage of opinions (out of 81) in which these legislative history types were
cited is as follows: 48.1% (39 of 81) of the opinions in which legislative history is cited refer to
committee reports, 24.7% (20 of 81) refer to the statute’s evolution over time, 12.3% (10 of 81) refer
to floor statements or debates, 7.4% (6 of 81) refer to hearings, 6.2% (5 of 81) refer to the absence of
legislative history and invoke the “dog that did not bark canon,” and 7.4% (6 of 81) reference other
types.
74. See Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1093 (reporting that congressional committee reports are cited in
32% of the cases studied, debates in 16.9% of cases studied, and hearing material in 12.6% of the cases
studied).
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Further, purpose, practical consequences, legislative history, and
substantive canons were referenced at nearly equal rates in both majority
and dissenting opinions, whereas dictionaries, other statutes, common
law precedents, text/plain meaning, and Supreme Court precedent were
75
referenced at statistically significantly higher rates in majority opinions.
This dichotomy suggests that the majority, or winning coalition,
approach to interpreting statutes may not be the Court’s exclusive
interpretive method or the approach of choice for all members of the
Court. Moreover, it hints at a methodological divide in the Court’s
jurisprudence—between landscape-coherence oriented interpretive tools
(higher rates of reference in majority opinions) and statute-specific
coherence-oriented interpretive tools (higher or equal rates of reference
in dissenting opinions).
C. The Coherence Divide
Recent empirical work has shown that traditional distinctions pitting
textualism against intentionalism are artificial, at least when it comes to
76
describing actual Supreme Court practice. All of the studies discussed in
Part I found significant Supreme Court reliance on both text and
legislative history, and the two most comprehensive studies found that
the Justices often rely on both textual and legislative history sources in
77
the same case. Based on their observations, the authors of these prior
78
studies labeled the Court’s interpretive approach “eclectic,”
79
80
81
“pluralis[t],” “common law originalist,” and “dynamic-pragmatic,”
concluding that the Justices mix and match interpretive rules
indeterminately. As explained in the Introduction, my empirical and
doctrinal analysis of the Roberts Court’s 2005–2008 Terms’ statutory
opinions suggests that there is more coherence and method to the
interpretive madness than these prior studies acknowledge.
Doctrinally, I argue that there are two basic interpretative camps on
the Roberts Court: those Justices whose goal in construing statutes is to
harmonize the individual statute with the rest of the legal landscape, and
those Justices whose goal is to ensure that the specific policy embodied in
the individual statute is sensibly and consistently applied, both internally
and over time. I noted in the Introduction that the two camps exhibit
different rates of reliance on particular interpretive tools, based on which
interpretive goal the tools promote. Before turning to the data in Table

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See supra Table 1.
See, e.g., Schacter, supra note 8, at 5; Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1117–18.
See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text (referencing the Cross and Zeppos studies).
Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1119.
Cross, supra note 9, at 158.
Schacter, supra note 8, at 54.
See Zeppos, supra note 9, at 1091, 1107–13.
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2, a few further words are in order to explain why certain interpretive
tools should be considered landscape-coherence fostering, and others
statute-specific coherence fostering. I begin with the interpretive aids
that foster landscape coherence.
1. Camp One: Legal-Landscape Coherence Tools
Other Statutes. References to other statutes reflect a sort of “whole
code” approach to statutory interpretation, in which the statute at issue is
viewed as one component of a larger whole—that is, the United States
Code. When the Justices rely on the meaning given to similar words and
phrases in the rest of the United States Code to interpret the individual
statute before the Court, they are ensuring that the individual statute
“fits” or coheres with the existing statutory backdrop. The Justices often
explain their reliance on other statutes by noting that Congress is
“presumed” to be aware of the existing statutory landscape when it
drafts new statutes, and to incorporate interpretations given to relevant
82
preexisting statutes into the new statutes it enacts; however, such
83
“presumptions” are little more than a legal fiction devised to legitimate
judicial common law-style synthesis and harmonizing of multiple federal
statutes.
The Dictionary Rule. When a Justice references the dictionary to
give meaning to the words or phrases in a statute, he or she is promoting
a coherent legal landscape in two ways. First, when the dictionary
referenced is Black’s Law Dictionary, the Justice is giving the individual
statute a meaning that is based upon longstanding legal customs or
conventions. Nearly 60% of the Roberts Court cases that reference the
84
dictionary use a definition from Black’s Law Dictionary; thus, this form
of landscape harmonization is at work in the majority of dictionary rule
cases. Second, even when the Justices reference a dictionary other than
Black’s Law, they are interpreting the individual statute based on a
conventional meaning contained in an external, convention-reflecting
source. This convention-reflecting source, moreover, can be consulted in

82. See, e.g., Atl. Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2577 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“When Congress incorporated FELA unaltered into the Jones Act, Congress must have intended to
incorporate FELA’s limitation on damages as well. We assume that Congress is aware of existing law
when it passes legislation.”); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370 (2008) (“[W]hen
judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the
same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial
interpretations as well.” (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85
(2006))).
83. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 16 (“[Courts] simply assume . . . that the enacting legislature
was aware of all those other laws. Well of course that is a fiction . . . .”).
84. Nearly 58% (26 of 45) of the majority opinions that referenced the dictionary cited Black’s
Law Dictionary; 57.1% (28 of 49) of the cases that referenced the dictionary in at least one opinion
cited Black’s Law Dictionary; and 47.7% (31 of 65) of all opinions that referenced the dictionary cited
Black’s Law Dictionary. See Appendix B on file with the Hastings Law Journal.
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subsequent cases to give the same meaning to the same words in other
statutes or to other legal materials, continuing the landscape cohesion
down the line. Indeed, to the extent that reliance on dictionary
85
definitions—particularly from the same one or two dictionaries —
becomes a staple of statutory interpretation, the dictionary itself acts as a
harmonizing device, rather like a “Federal Code of Definitions”
applicable to all statutes.
Common Law Precedent. As with references to other statutes, when
a Justice uses common law precedent as an interpretive aid, he or she is
harmonizing the individual statute at issue with the existing legal
backdrop. Statutory construction in light of common law rules promotes
continuity and consistency throughout the legal system by forging a
connecting thread between old laws and new laws, judge-made law and
86
legislatively enacted law.
Substantive Canons. Substantive canons are interpretive
presumptions and rules based on background legal norms, policies, and
87
conventions. They derive primarily from the common law, the
88
Constitution, and legal tradition. Perhaps the most famous substantive
canon is the rule of lenity, which is based on an accused’s due process
89
right to fair notice of the conduct prohibited by a criminal statute. The
canon dictates that when a criminal statute is ambiguous and allows for
more than one interpretation, courts should choose the interpretation
90
that favors the defendant. Other prominent substantive canons include

85. The Court relied on one of two dictionaries (or both) in the overwhelming majority of its
cases. The first was Black’s Law Dictionary, which was referenced in 57.7% of the cases. The second
was Webster’s, either in the Third New International or New International edition or, on occasion, one
of the Collegiate editions. A full 49% (24 of 49) of the cases citing a dictionary referenced Webster’s;
42.2% (19 of 45) of the majority opinions citing the dictionary referenced Webster’s; and 53.8% (35 of
65) of the opinions that cited a dictionary referenced Webster’s. A few of the cases and opinions
referenced both Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s New International Dictionary; only 4 of 49 cases
and 6 of 65 opinions referencing the dictionary failed to cite either Black’s Law Dictionary or
Webster’s. The American Heritage Dictionary was referenced in 7 cases and opinions; Random House
was referenced in 8 cases and 9 opinions; and the Oxford English Dictionary was referenced in 8 cases
and opinions. See Appendix B on file with the Hastings Law Journal.
86. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 275–76 (1994).
87. See, e.g., Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 5, at 13.
88. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 86, at 276; Brudney & Ditslear, Canons, supra note 5, at 13
(“[S]ubstantive canons reflect judicially-based concerns, grounded in the courts’ understanding of how
to treat statutory text with reference to judicially perceived constitutional priorities, pre-enactment
common law practices, or specific statutorily based policies.”).
89. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 397 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
90. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 289 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); McNally v.
United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 579–80 (1977)
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The rule of lenity was relied upon in 12.5% (6 of 48) of the Roberts Court
2005–2008 Term cases that referenced a substantive canon. See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849,
1859 (2009); United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1088–89 (2009); United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct.
2020, 2024–26 (2008); United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 404–05 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting);
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the avoidance canon, which directs the courts to avoid interpreting a
statute in a manner that would render it unconstitutional or would raise
91
serious constitutional concerns, and federalism clear-statement rules,
which impose a strong interpretive presumption that unless Congress
clearly expresses its intent to infringe on state rights in the text of a
statute, the statute must not be interpreted to interfere with state
92
93
94
functions, laws, or processes. Subject-matter-specific substantive
canons include rules calling for deference for the practice and precedent
95
96
of the Patent Office, narrow construction of tax exemptions, and a
97
strong presumption in favor of enforcing labor arbitration agreements.
The substantive canons are, by nature non-statute-specific external rules,
designed to navigate the boundaries between individual statutes and the
rest of the puzzle pieces in the legal landscape. The avoidance canon, for
example, seeks to side-step potential friction between the statute and
constitutional principles, while federalism clear-statement rules attempt
to fit federal statutes in and around existing state laws. Thus, when a
Justice relies on a substantive canon to interpret a statute, he or she
ensures that the individual statute is given a meaning that coheres with
the background legal landscape.

James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 219 (2007); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9,
17–18 (2006).
91. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 646 (2005); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 696–99 (2001); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465–66 (1989). The avoidance
canon was relied on in 18.8% (9 of 48) of the Roberts Court cases that referenced a substantive canon.
See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009); FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009); Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 129 S. Ct.
1436, 1445 (2009); Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1247 (2009); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723, 787 (2008); Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 251 (2008); Office of Senator Mark Dayton v.
Hanson, 550 U.S. 511, 514 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153 (2007); Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715, 737–38 (2006).
92. See, e.g., Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 138 (2004); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994).
93. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 (2002); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
94. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 268 n.6 (1991); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 388 (1991). Federalism clear-statement rules, including the presumption
against preemption of state laws, were referenced in 16.7% (8 of 48) of the Roberts Court cases that
employed a substantive canon. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194–95 (2009); Altria Group,
Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly
Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2337 (2008); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 31 (2007); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at
738; Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006); Empire Healthchoice
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 698 (2006).
95. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 248 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 357 (1988).
97. See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); Groves v. Ring Screw
Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 498 U.S. 168, 173 (1990).
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2. Camp Two: Statute-Specific Coherence Tools
Purpose. When the Court relies on a statute’s purpose, objective, or
underlying goals to give meaning to the words in the statute, it promotes
continuity and coherence within the individual statute. Statutory purpose
is a statute-specific interpretive resource; it comes from the four corners
of the statute itself—usually the preamble—or from external sources
specific to the statute at issue, such as the legislative history created
during the statute’s drafting process. In this sense, purpose is a markedly
different interpretive resource from the legal-landscape coherence tools,
which employ sources external to the statute at issue—such as the
dictionary, common law, or other statutes—to harmonize the specific
statute’s meaning with the broader legal framework.
Legislative History. Legislative history, like statutory purpose, is a
statute-specific interpretive device that has almost nothing to do with the
external legal landscape. It is a source external to the statute’s four
corners, but one that is deeply related to those four corners; indeed, it
includes materials that are the precursor to the statutory text at issue.
Thus, when the Justices reference a statute’s evolution from bill to law,
or statements made by those who drafted the statute as interpretive aids,
they are using the statute’s past to provide context for its application to
the present situation. Whether they reference legislative history to
corroborate an interpretation arrived at through other tools, to clarify
the scope of a particular word, or to understand how different statutory
sections fit together, their focus is on all of the background information
available for the individual statute at issue and on connecting the dots to
ensure a consistent and coherent statutory policy. In contrast to the
landscape-coherence approach, which harmonizes the individual statute’s
meaning with the external legal background, interpretive references to
legislative history seek to discover the individual statute’s meaning from
its own internal background.
Intent. References to legislative intent as an interpretive aid or
justification for a particular statutory construction also focus on the
background of the individual statute at issue, rather than on the
surrounding legal landscape. Indeed, many of the Roberts Court’s
references to legislative intent take the form of inferences based on the
98
statute’s design, structure, or previous versions. When the Justices

98. See, e.g., Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2102, 2107 (2009) (“[The] history [of the
Controlled Substances Act] drives home what is already clear in the current statutory text: Congress
meant to treat purchasing drugs for personal use more leniently than the felony of distributing drugs,
and to narrow the scope of the communications provision to cover only those who facilitate a drug
felony. . . . [I]t is impossible to believe that Congress intended ‘facilitating’ to cause that twelve-fold
quantum leap in punishment for simple drug possessors [who use a telephone to facilitate a drug
purchase].”); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 735–36 (2008) (holding that the Detainee Treatment
Act’s grant of “exclusive” jurisdiction to the courts of appeals shows Congress’s intent that the courts
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emphasize the intent reflected in a statutory provision, they are focusing
on the particular statute’s policy and on keeping that policy both
internally coherent and consistent over time.
3. Camp-Transcendent Interpretive Tools
Supreme Court Precedent. Prior judicial interpretations, like
practical consequences, can foster both legal-landscape coherence and
statute-specific coherence. Precedents in the relevant area of law,
particularly interpretations given by the Supreme Court to the same
words or phrases in similar statutes, are part of the legal landscape
against which the statute at issue is being construed. Thus, efforts to
reconcile or give meaning to an individual statute in light of the Court’s
prior interpretations promote consistency and continuity in the legal
system writ large. But this is not the only kind of consistency that
reliance on Supreme Court precedent can promote. References to prior
interpretations of the statutory provision at issue, other sections of the
statute at issue, or related statutes on which the statute at issue was
modeled can also foster statute-specific coherence by ensuring that the
meaning given to the individual statute remains consistent across time
99
and across similar situations.
Whole Act Rule. The whole act rule has many subparts, all of which
focus in some way on the structure of the statute at issue and how its
different sections fit together. One frequently referenced subpart is the
rule against superfluities, which instructs courts to interpret a statute in a
manner that gives effect to all of its provisions, such that no one part is
100
rendered superfluous by another. Another regularly referenced subpart
of the whole act rule is the presumption of statutory consistency, which
directs courts to interpret the same or similar terms in a statute the same
101
way. The whole act rule is at once focused on both the individual

of appeals have a more limited role in enemy combatant status determinations than a district court has
in habeas corpus proceedings); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 17–20 (2006)
(stating that Congress did not intend for the Hobbs Act to create a freestanding physical violence
offense, as evidenced by the fact that the Hobbs Act’s predecessor statute explicitly linked the physical
violence it prohibited to a plan or purpose to injure commerce through coercion or extortion).
99. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2009) (holding that Title IX
does not preclude § 1983 actions alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools based, in
part, on precedents interpreting Title VI and the fact that Title IX was modeled on Title VI); Flood v.
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972) (holding that the Sherman Antitrust Act does not apply to baseball,
because the Court had previously so held (citing Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953);
Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922))).
100. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 129 S. Ct. 2230, 2234 (2009);
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001);
United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 59 (1997); 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 46.06, at 181–86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is
given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .”).
101. See, e.g., Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007); IBP, Inc. v.
Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005); Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1996);
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statute and the entire United States Code. It promotes policy coherence
within the individual statute by ensuring that the statute’s various parts
make sense when read together; but it also promotes consistency and
coherence in the United States Code by ensuring that certain parts of the
Code—of which individual statutes are of course included—are not
rendered extraneous or meaningless, and by harmonizing the meaning
given to the same or similar words throughout all sections and
102
subsections of the Code. In other words, the whole act rule fosters
landscape coherence between the statutory provision at issue and the
immediately adjacent puzzle piece in the legal landscape—that is, other
provisions of the same statute.
4. The Practical Consequences Divide
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the coherence divide
identified in this study is the following doctrinal dichotomy. There
appear to be two different categories of practical consequences—
tracking the two interpretive camps—that the Justices reference when
construing statutes. The first category, which might aptly be labeled
“administrability concerns,” encompasses discussions about the practical
103
difficulty of administering a particular interpretation, the likely effect
104
on judicial or other public resources of a particular interpretation, the

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995).
102. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes
and the Creation of Public Policy 1066 (4th ed. 2007) (likening the whole act rule’s presumption
that a word used multiple times in a statute has the same meaning throughout the statute to whole
code/other statutes rules dictating that the statute at issue should be construed in light of
interpretations already given to other federal statutes using the same language or dealing with the
same subject matter—more specifically known as the in pari materia—and modeled or borrowed
statutes’ rules).
103. See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009) (“Price Waterhouse[’s]
burden-shifting framework is difficult to apply. . . . [so] even if Price Waterhouse was doctrinally sound,
the problems associated with its application have eliminated any perceivable benefit to extending its
framework to ADEA claims.”); Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1244–45 (2009) (“Determining
whether a [VRA] § 2 claim would lie . . . would place courts in the untenable position of predicting
many political variables . . . that even experienced polling analysts and political experts could not
assess with certainty, particularly over the long term.”); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U.S. 158, 169
(2007) (“Departing from the common-law practice of applying a single causation for negligence and
contributory negligence would have been a peculiar approach for Congress to take . . . [because as] a
practical matter, it is difficult to reduce damages ‘in proportion’ to the employee’s negligence if the
relevance of each party’s negligence to the injury is measured by a different standard of
causation. . . . [I]t is far simpler for a jury to conduct the apportionment FELA mandates if the jury
compares like with like—apples to apples.”).
104. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–50 (2008) (“Giving the attorney control of trial
management matters is a practical necessity. ‘The adversary process could not function effectively if
every tactical decision required client approval.’ . . . For these reasons we conclude that [the statute
must be read so] that express consent by counsel suffices to permit magistrate judge to preside over
jury selection . . . .” (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988))); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.
930, 943 (2007) (“As a result [of an alternative construction], conscientious defense attorneys would be
obligated to file unripe (and, in many cases, meritless) . . . claims . . . . This counterintuitive approach
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consistency or lack thereof between federal and state laws created by the
105
interpretation, and the clarity or predictability of the legal rule or
106
landscape going forward, in light of the interpretation. The second
category, which I have dubbed “policy constancy concerns,” includes
discussions about the inconsistencies in statutory policy likely to result
107
108
the fairness of an interpretation,
the
from an interpretation,
likelihood that the interpretation will render the statutory provision
109
“meaningless” or ineffective, and the possibility that logical absurdities

would add to the burden imposed on courts, applicants, and the States, with no clear advantage to
any.”).
105. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2717–18 (2009) (finding that
everyone acknowledges that the National Bank Act leaves in place some state substantive laws
affecting banks, but the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s regulation says that the State may
not enforce its valid non-preempted laws against national banks, and that this is a “bizarre” result);
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1230–31 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority’s
interpretation for creating an incoherent regulatory scheme by allowing state tort law claims based on
a hospital’s use of a risky IV-injection practice approved by the FDA for drug A, when the FDA
continues to allow the practice for more dangerous cancer medications with a greater risk of causing
death—thus, rendering the federal regulations inconsistent with state tort law); United States v.
Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 383 (2008) (finding that an alternative interpretation would result in the
possibility that defendants offending for a second, third, or more times could be sentenced in state
court to more than five years for a crime that federal courts had deemed, for purposes of the Armed
Career Criminal Act, to have a maximum term of five years).
106. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 419–20 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“Today’s decision does nothing—absolutely nothing—to solve the problem that under the EEOC’s
current processes no one can tell, ex ante, whether a particular filing is or is not a charge.”); James v.
United States, 550 U.S. 192, 215 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s interpretation
as “ad hoc” and for failing to provide concrete guidance to lower courts going forward).
107. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 94–95 (2007) (finding the disparity between
recommended sentences for crack cocaine and powder cocaine means that a major supplier of powder
cocaine could receive a shorter sentence than a low-level dealer who buys powder from the supplier
and converts it to crack); Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 84 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(finding it “makes scant sense” to distinguish between trading a gun for drugs, which counts as “use”
of a firearm, and trading drugs for a gun, which doesn’t count as “use” according to majority’s
opinion).
108. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2358–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that plaintiffs cannot prove
employer’s but-for reliance on age in age-discrimination cases, since the employer is in best position to
know what he or she was thinking at the time, so the fair and appropriate test is whether plaintiff can
show that the forbidden motive played some role in the employer’s decision); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen,
129 S. Ct. 1962, 1977–78 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the plaintiffs, comprised of
female retirees seeking to have their pregnancy leave included in their pension calculations, made
“modest claims,” which could be satisfied without interrupting the “settled expectations of other
workers”).
109. United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079, 1087 (2009) (“[Alternative construction] would
[render the statute] ‘a dead letter’ in some two-thirds of the States from the very moment of its
enactment.”); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649–50 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that because salaries often are kept confidential, a victim of Title VII
discrimination may not know immediately that she has been discriminated against, and that it is
meaningless to give victims the right to sue but then bar recovery if they do not sue immediately, even
if they are not initially aware of the discrimination), overruled by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, Pub. L. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
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or statutory incoherence are likely to result from the interpretation.
These two categories of practical consequences give precedence to
different aspects of the interpretive task and seem to reflect the
interpretive priorities at work in the landscape- versus statute-specific
coherence divide. Like the landscape-coherence approach, administrability
concerns focus on how a particular interpretation will affect the legal
system—that is, whether it will waste judicial resources, whether it will
prove impossible or burdensome to administer, whether it will result in
unclear or unpredictable rules, and whether it will cause a conflict
between rules set by different institutions, such as legislative versus
executive, federal versus state, and administrative versus judicial entities.
Conversely, policy constancy concerns track the statute-specific
coherence approach in that they focus on ensuring that the statute at
issue is applied consistently over time and across like situations, that it is
applied in a just manner, and that it is not given an interpretation that
renders it meaningless or nonsensical. A few examples should help
illustrate these differences.
In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy,
the statutory issue was whether the parents of a disabled student who
111
had won an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
lawsuit against their child’s school district could recover expert
112
consultant’s fees from the district. The relevant statutory text enables
parents who bring successful IDEA lawsuits to recover “reasonable
113
attorneys’ fees,” but says nothing about expert’s fees. The Court ruled,
6–3, that absent express statutory authority indicating that school
districts would be liable for expert’s fees, successful IDEA litigants could
114
not recover such fees. Justice Breyer, writing in dissent, made a typical
“policy constancy” practical consequences argument. Experts, he noted,
115
are necessary for most IDEA cases but are very expensive. Absent the
possibility of ultimately recovering an expert’s fees from the school
district, many disabled litigants and their parents might be unwilling to

110. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2495 (2009) (finding the school district’s
interpretation “would produce a rule bordering on the irrational” whereby IDEA would provide a
remedy when the school district offers child an inadequate individualized education program, but not
in the “more egregious situation” where the school district unreasonably denies a child access to such
services altogether); Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(finding that the majority’s construction produces the “strange result” of imposing a substantially
harsher penalty for an accidental act caused not by an “evil-meaning mind,” but by a clumsy hand,
than would be imposed for the intentional act of brandishing a firearm).
111. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2006).
112. 548 U.S. 291, 293–94 (2006).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 296–97.
115. Id. at 314 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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116

hire experts in the first place. As a result, he worried that disabled
litigants would have a harder time proving an IDEA violation, and that
the majority’s interpretation would lead to underenforcement of the
rights protected by the IDEA, as well as render the IDEA provision
allowing lawsuits and attorney’s fees against non-complying school
117
districts meaningless. In other words, Justice Breyer expressed concern
that the statute’s individual policy (as opposed to the legal landscape)
would be rendered incoherent by the majority’s interpretation.
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in FCC v. Fox Television
118
Stations, Inc. similarly invoked policy constancy arguments about the
practical consequences that would result from the majority’s
119
interpretation of the Federal Communications Act. The statutory
provision at issue prohibits the broadcasting of “any obscene, indecent,
120
or profane language.” The FCC had, for years, interpreted this
provision in a manner that counted as indecent only “deliberate and
121
repetitive use [of expletives] in a patently offensive manner.” In 2006,
however, the FCC changed its interpretation, deeming “actionably
indecent” two live broadcasts in which celebrities fleetingly uttered two
122
expletives, one as a slap-in-the-face to her critics, and another as a joke.
In upholding the FCC’s reversal, the majority construed the word
“indecent” to include any expletive that has a “sexual or excretory
origin” (and argued that its prior case law had endorsed this definition as
123
well). Justice Stevens criticized the FCC’s interpretation on two policy
constancy fronts. First, he argued that the majority’s interpretation

116. Id.
117. Id. at 315–16 (“In a word, the Act’s statutory right to a ‘free’ and ‘appropriate’ education may
mean little to those who must pay hundreds of dollars to obtain it. . . . Today’s result will leave many
parents and guardians ‘without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition,’ a far cry from
the level playing field that Congress envisioned.” (citation omitted) (quoting Shaffer v. Weast, 546
U.S. 46, 61 (2005))).
118. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
119. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–614 (2000).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006); Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–356, 16a,
106 Stat. 949, 954 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 note (2000)).
121. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1806–07, 1827 (quoting Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699,
¶13 (1987)).
122. Id. at 1808.
The first [incident] occurred during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, when the singer Cher
exclaimed, “I’ve also had critics for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every
year. Right. So f*** ‘em.” The second involved a segment of the 2003 Billboard Music
Awards, during the presentation of an award by Nicole Richie and Paris Hilton, principals
in a Fox television series called “The Simple Life.” Ms. Hilton began their interchange by
reminding Ms. Richie to “watch the bad language,” but Ms. Richie proceeded to ask the
audience, “Why do they even call it ‘The Simple Life?’ Have you ever tried to get cow s***
out of a Prada purse? It’s not so f***ing simple.”
Id.
123. Id. at 1805–06.
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would lead to absurd results—for example, a golfer who shanks a shot
and swears would now be considered to be describing sex or
124
excrement. Second, he emphasized that the FCC was making a big
policy shift without acknowledging it and without giving reasons for the
shift, and he maintained that it was arbitrary and capricious—or,
incoherent—for the agency to reverse its longstanding policy without
125
providing some justification for the change.
In the opposite vein, Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court in Richlin
126
advanced classic administrability
Security Service Co. v. Chertoff
arguments in favor of its interpretation of the Equal Access to Justice
127
Act (EAJA). After prevailing against the Government on a claim
originating in the Department of Transportation’s Board of Contract
Appeals, Richlin filed an application with the Board seeking
reimbursement of its attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs, pursuant to the
128
EAJA. The issue in the case was whether Richlin was entitled to
recover its paralegal fees from the Government at prevailing market
129
rates, or at the cost to the law firm of the paralegal’s time. The Court
concluded that the EAJA authorized Richlin to recover the fees at
prevailing market rates noting the practical infeasibility of the
130
Government’s proffered interpretation. Justice Alito argued that a rule
requiring parties and courts to calculate the cost to the firm of the
paralegal’s services would be extremely difficult to administer—requiring
complex accounting judgments about how to factor in the benefits and
other perks that form a significant part of a law firm’s compensation to
131
its paralegals and other staff. The Court noted that market rates, by
contrast, provide a “transparent” and comparatively simple basis for
132
calculating the amount to which a prevailing party is entitled. Thus, in
the Court’s view: “It strains credulity that Congress would have
abandoned this predictable, workable framework for the uncertain and
complex accounting requirements that a cost-based rule would inflict on
133
litigants, their attorneys, administrative agencies, and the courts.”
134
Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good
provides a more extreme example of an administrability-focused
practical consequences argument. The issue in Altria was whether the

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1827 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1826–28.
128 S. Ct. 2007 (2008).
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(l) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006).
Richlin Sec. Serv. Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2010.
Id. at 2010–11.
Id. at 2018.
Id. at 2018–19.
Id. at 2019.
Id.
129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
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Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), which
preempts state laws “based on smoking and health,” barred respondents’
lawsuit claiming that Altria violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices
Act (MUTPA) by fraudulently advertising that its “light” cigarettes
136
delivered less tar and nicotine than regular brands. The majority ruled
that the MUTPA claims were not preempted because they were based
on the cigarette manufacturer’s duty not to deceive—a duty which itself
137
is not based on smoking and health. The Court’s interpretation relied
heavily on the reasoning of a prior case, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
which had established the relevant preemption inquiry to be “whether
the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action
constitutes a ‘requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
138
health.’” Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Altria, joined by
Justices Roberts, Alito, and Scalia, argued, in classic administrabilityconcern mode, that the Cipollone rule should be abandoned, because it
139
had proved unduly confusing and unworkable over the years. Justice
Thomas agreed with the district court that lower courts “remain divided
140
about what the decision means and how to apply it.” Noting that “stare
decisis considerations carry little weight” when a governing decision has
created “an unworkable legal regime,” the dissenters maintained that it
was high time for the Court to replace its current interpretation of the
141
FCLAA’s preemption provision with a practicably feasible one.
5. Individual Justices and the Coherence Divide
This subpart examines the Justices’ individual rates of reliance for
the various interpretive tools in the statutory opinions he or she authored
during the 2005–2008 Terms—including all majority, concurring,
dissenting, and splintered partial opinions. I focus on opinions authored,
rather than merely joined, by each Justice on the theory that the Justices
have greater control over which interpretive resources to reference when
they author opinions than they do when they only sign on to one.
Table 2 lists the individual Justices’ rates of reliance for each
interpretive tool measured in the study. The total number of opinions
authored by each Justice also is listed. Table 3 ranks the interpretive
tools used most frequently by each Justice. Table 4 lists each Justice’s
rates of reference, in the opinions he or she authored, for particular
forms of practical consequences. The references are subdivided into

135. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006).
136. Altria Grp., 129 S. Ct. at 541 (citing Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 207 (2008)).
137. Id. at 546.
138. 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).
139. Altria Grp.,129 S. Ct. at 551, 554–55.
140. Id. at 555 (quoting Good v. Altria Grp., Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142 (Me. 2006)).
141. Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
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administrability versus policy constancy-type concerns and the rates are
expressed as a percentage of the total number of opinions in which each
Justice used practical consequences as an interpretive tool. Table 5
reports the landscape-coherence Justices’ overall rates of reference, as a
group, to administrability versus policy constancy concerns, as well as the
statute-specific coherence Justices’ overall rates of reference, as a group,
to each category of practical consequence concerns. Again, the numbers
are low, so it is important to focus on large-scale trends rather than
precise percentages.
Table 2: Rates of Reliance on Interpretive Canons and Tools by
142
Opinion Author
Canons/ Interpretive
Tools

Scalia
(n = 41)

Thomas
(n = 47)

Alito
(n = 32)

Roberts
(n = 26)

Kennedy
(n = 30)

Text/Plain Meaning*

61.0%

66.0%

62.5%

50.0%

43.3%

Dictionary Rule
Language Canons
(Grammar &
Linguistic)
Other Statutes
Common Law

22.0%

29.8%

28.1%

11.5%

23.3%

7.3%

14.9%

15.6%

19.2%

13.3%

26.8%
17.1%

19.1%
10.6%

43.8%
6.3%

30.8%
11.5%

23.3%
3.3%

Substantive Canons

9.7%

14.9%

15.6%

30.8%

13.3%

Whole Act Rule

24.4%

34.0%

28.1%

46.1%

23.3%

Agency Deference

14.6%

2.1%

6.3%

0.0%

10.0%

34.1%

44.7%

34.4%

53.9%

56.7%

29.2%

14.9%

31.3%

38.5%

43.3%

Purpose*

7.3%

14.9%

31.3%

11.5%

43.3%

Intent*

2.4%

6.4%

25.0%

7.7%

10.0%

Legislative History*

9.8%

8.5%

15.6%

18.2%

20.0%

Supreme Court
Precedent
Practical
Consequences

142. * Indicates that one-way ANOVA test, using Bonferroni multiple comparison test, reveals a
significant difference between rates of reliance by different Justices in the opinions they authored at
p < .001. (For Purpose, p =.0004; for Intent, p < .0001; and for Legislative History, p = .0001).
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Canons/ Interpretive
Tools

Souter
(n = 34)

Ginsburg
(n = 33)

Breyer
(n = 48)

Stevens
(n = 47)

Text/Plain Meaning*

47.1%

33.3%

20.8%

46.8%

Dictionary Rule
Language Canons
(Grammar &
Linguistic)
Other Statutes
Common Law

17.7%

15.2%

14.3%

11.9%

5.9%

6.1%

8.3%

6.4%

23.5%
14.7%

27.3%
0.0%

20.8%
4.2%

19.1%
17.0%

Substantive Canons

14.7%

12.1%

8.3%

27.7%

Whole Act Rule

32.4%

30.3%

18.8%

21.3%

Agency Deference

11.8%

9.1%

12.5%

8.5%

55.9%

48.5%

41.7%

51.1%

32.4%

51.5%

39.6%

31.9%

17.7%
23.5%

39.4%
24.2%

37.5%
27.1%

29.8%
46.8%

29.4%

36.4%

37.5%

38.3%

Supreme Court
Precedent
Practical
Consequences
Purpose*
Intent*
Legislative History*

Despite this limitation, the data reveal a striking divide between the
members of the Roberts Court over the interpretive sources they most
often choose to reference when authoring a statutory opinion. All of the
Justices except Justices Alito, Ginsburg and Breyer referenced text/plain
meaning and Supreme Court precedent more frequently than any of the
143
other interpretive tools. This hardly is shocking, as text and precedent
are the two most conventional legal resources, and the Justices may
regularly refer to them to legitimate the Court’s statutory decisions and
144
to create a public perception of neutral decisionmaking. Once we look
beyond these two conventional legal resources, the Justices’ patterns of
reliance fall rather neatly into the two interpretive camps described in
this Article: legal-landscape versus statute-specific coherence. Specifically,
the opinions authored by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Kennedy,
and Alito exhibited the highest rates of reliance for interpretive tools
that promote legal-landscape coherence—that is, other statutes, the
dictionary rule, and practical consequences emphasizing administrability145
based concerns. At the same time, the opinions authored by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens exhibited the highest rates of
reliance on interpretive tools that promote statute-specific coherence—

143. See infra Table 3.
144. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 68.
145. See supra Table 2; infra Table 3.
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that is, legislative history, purpose, intent, and practical consequences
146
focused on policy constancy concerns.
Table 3: Rankings of Interpretive Tools Used Most Often in
Authored Opinions
Scalia
Text/Plain Meaning
(61%)
Supreme Ct.
Precedent (34.1%)
Practical
Consequences
(29.2%)

1
2

Thomas
1
2

3

Other Statutes
(26.8%)

3

Whole Act Rule
(24.4%)
Dictionary Rule
(22%)
Common Law
Precedent (17.1%)

4

2

Text/Plain Meaning
(62.5%)
Other Statutes
(43.8%)
Supreme Ct
Precedent (34.4%)

4

1

2

Other Statutes
(19.1%)

Supreme Ct.
Precedent (44.7%)
Text/Plain Meaning
(43.3%)
Practical
Consequences
(43.3%)
Purpose (43.3%)

Purpose (31.3%)
Dictionary Rule
(28.1%)
Whole Act Rule
(28.1%)

2
3

4

Kennedy

Practical
Consequences
(31.3%)
3

Whole Act Rule
(34%)

1

Dictionary Rule
(29.8%)

Alito
1

Text/Plain Meaning
(66%)
Supreme Ct.
Precedent (44.7%)

Roberts

3

Intent (25%)

146. See supra Table 2; infra Table 3.

Whole Act Rule
(23.3%)
Dictionary Rule
(23.3%)
Other Statutes
(23.3%)

Supreme Ct.
Precedent (53.9%)
Text/Plain Meaning
(50%)
Whole Act Rule
(46%)
Practical
Consequences
(38.5%)
Other Statutes
(30.8%)
Substantive Canons
(30.8%)

Souter
1
2

3

Supreme Ct.
Precedent (55.9%)
Text/Plain Meaning
(47.1%)
Practical
Consequences
(32.4%)
Whole Act Rule
(32.4%)
Legislative History
(29.4%)

4

Intent (23.5%)
Other Statutes
(23.5%)
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Ginsburg
1

Practical
Consequences
(51.5%)

2

Supreme Ct.
Precedent (48.5%)
Purpose (39.4%)

3

4

Breyer
1

2

Legislative History
(36.4%)
Text/Plain Meaning
(33.3%)
Whole Act Rule
(30.3%)
Other Statutes
(27.3%)
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Supreme Ct.
Precedent (41.7%)
Practical
Consequences
(39.6%)
Purpose (37.5%)
Legislative History
(37.5%)

3
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Stevens
1

2

Supreme Ct.
Precedent (51.1%)
Text/Plain Meaning
(46.8%)
Intent (46.8%)

3

Intent (27.1%)

4

Legislative History
(38.3%)
Practical
Consequences
(31.9%)
Purpose (29.8%)
Substantive Canons
(27.7%)

Intent (24.2%)

As Tables 2 and 3 illustrate, the lines dividing the two camps, while
stark, are not absolute. Two Justices in each camp showed noteworthy
crossover reliance on interpretive tools that promote the opposite camp’s
approach. Justices Kennedy and Alito exhibited relatively high rates of
reliance on statutory purpose, and Justice Alito also relied with notable
frequency on legislative intent, while Justices Souter and Ginsburg
exhibited noteworthy rates of reliance on other statutes and Justice
Stevens exhibited a noteworthy rate of reliance on substantive canons.
Significantly, the landscape-coherence Justices were far less inclined
to reference interpretive tools that promote statute-specific coherence
than the statute-specific coherence Justices were to employ landscapecoherence promoting interpretive tools. Justice Scalia, for example,
exhibited remarkably low rates of reliance—less than 10%—for the three
most distinctly statute-specific coherence-promoting interpretive tools:
147
purpose, intent, and legislative history. Justice Thomas exhibited
similarly low rates of reliance on intent and legislative history, and only a
148
slightly higher rate of reliance on purpose. Justice Roberts’s rates of
reliance on the statute-specific coherence-promoting interpretive tools

147. See supra Table 2 (reporting that Justice Scalia referenced legislative history in 9.8% of the
opinions he authored; statutory purpose in 7.3% of the opinions he authored; and legislative intent in
2.4% of the opinions he authored).
148. See supra Table 2 (reporting that Justice Thomas referenced legislative history in 8.5% of the
opinions he authored; statutory purpose in 14.9% of the opinions he authored; and legislative intent in
6.4% of the opinions he authored).
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were marginally higher than Justice Scalia’s and Justice Thomas’s, but
149
still were extremely low.
By contrast, each of the statute-specific coherence Justices exhibited
non-marginal rates of reliance on at least one landscape-coherence
promoting tool. Justices Souter and Stevens, for example, relied
somewhat frequently—and at rates comparable to the landscape150
coherence Justices—on substantive canons and common law precedent.
Further, each Justice in the statute-specific coherence camp referenced
151
other statutes in roughly 20% of the opinions he or she authored. As
Table 3 shows, the statute-specific coherence Justices relied with less
frequency on landscape-coherence tools than they did on the statutespecific coherence tools, but they did not reject the landscape coherence
tools the way that the landscape-coherence Justices rejected most of the
statute-specific coherence tools. Indeed, for the top two landscapecoherence promoting interpretive tools—other statutes and the
dictionary—the statute-specific coherence Justices’ rates of reliance,
while lower than the landscape-coherence Justices’ rates, did not fall
below 10%, or even below 15% in most cases, unlike Justices Scalia’s,
Thomas’s, and Roberts’s rates of reliance on the top two or three statute152
specific coherence-promoting interpretive tools. The reasons for this
difference in the two camps’ willingness to rely on canons and tools
promoting the other camp’s preferred interpretive approach are unclear.
It could be that Justice Scalia’s rants against the use of legislative history,
intent, or purpose in interpreting statutes have influenced Justices
Thomas and Roberts and, to a lesser extent, Justices Alito and Kennedy,
153
to diminish or eliminate their reliance on these interpretive tools.
Another possibility is that the Justices who prioritize statute-specific
coherence also are concerned with ensuring a coherent legal landscape,
as long as the two kinds of coherence are not in conflict. Alternatively,
the statute-specific coherence-leaning Justices may find it necessary to
use some landscape-coherence oriented tools in their opinions in order to
win or retain the votes of their landscape-oriented colleagues—
particularly those landscape-coherence Justices who exhibit little affinity

149. See supra Table 2 (reporting that Justice Roberts referenced legislative history in 18.2% of
the opinions he authored; statutory purpose in 11.5% of the opinions he authored; and legislative
intent in 7.7% of the opinions he authored).
150. See supra Table 2 (reporting that Justice Souter referenced both substantive canons and
common law precedent in 14.7% of the opinions he authored, and that Justice Stevens referenced
substantive canons in 27.7% of the opinions he authored and common law precedent in 17% of the
opinions he authored).
151. See supra Table 2.
152. See supra Table 3.
153. But see Law & Zaring, supra note 6, at 1728–29 (finding no evidence to support a “Scalia
effect” diminishing other Justices’ use of legislative history).
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for the statute-specific coherence canons (such as Roberts, Scalia, and
Thomas).
In a related vein, the data suggest something of an inverse
relationship between judicial references to dictionary definitions on the
one hand, and legislative history on the other. Those Justices who
exhibited the highest rates of reference to dictionary definitions—
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia—also exhibited the lowest rates of
154
reliance on legislative history. Similarly, those Justices who exhibited
the highest rates of reliance on legislative history—Justices Stevens,
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter—exhibited the lowest rates of reference to
155
dictionary definitions. The exceptions, again, are crossover Justice
Roberts, who exhibited a low rate of reliance on the dictionary and also a
156
and Justice
medium-low rate of reliance on legislative history,
Kennedy, who exhibited comparable rates of reliance on both
157
interpretive tools. These differences in rates of reliance highlight the
fact that resort to dictionary definitions and resort to legislative history
reflect two very different philosophical approaches to statutory
construction. To date, scholars have viewed the battle between
dictionary and legislative history use as part of the mythical divide
158
between textualist and intentionalist judges. But the empirical and
doctrinal analysis presented in this Article suggests an alternative
explanation for the split. Perhaps the judicial divide is not so much over
text versus intent but, rather, over the relevant context for ensuring
statutory coherence. For those Justices who define coherence as

154. Justice Thomas referenced dictionary definitions in 29.8% of the opinions he authored but
referenced legislative history in only 8.5% of those opinions; Justice Alito referenced the dictionary in
28.1% of the cases he authored and legislative history in only 15.6% of the cases; Justice Scalia
referenced the dictionary in 22% of the cases he authored and legislative history in only 9.8% of his
opinions. See supra Table 2.
155. Justice Stevens invoked legislative history in 38.3% of the opinions he authored but relied on
the dictionary in only 11.9% of his opinions; Justice Breyer referenced legislative history in 37.5% of
the opinions he authored and the dictionary in only 14.3% of those opinions; Justice Ginsburg
referenced legislative history in 36.4% of her opinions and the dictionary in 15.2% of those same
opinions; and Justice Souter invoked legislative history in 29.4% of his opinions, while citing the
dictionary in 17.7%. See supra Table 2.
156. Justice Roberts referenced the dictionary in only 11.5% of the opinions he authored—the
lowest rate of reliance for any Justice, though essentially equal to Justice Stevens’s rate of reliance—
and invoked legislative history in 18.2% of the opinions he authored—more than all of the other
landscape-coherence Justices, save Justice Kennedy, but only half as often as most of the statutespecific Justices. See supra Table 2.
157. Justice Kennedy invoked the dictionary in 23.3% of the cases he authored and legislative
history in 20%. See supra Table 2.
158. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 1, at 32; see also Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of
Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J.
1750, 1762–64 (2010); Merrill, supra note 4, at 355–61; Schacter, supra note 8, at 5 (calling dictionary
references the “benchmark of the new textualism” and contrasting an apparent decline in dictionary
citations with an apparent “resurgence” in legislative history use).
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consistency across the legal landscape, the dictionary, as a surrogate
Code of Federal Definitions (or Code of Legal Custom, in the case of
Black’s Law Dictionary), is an ideal gap-filler; while for those Justices
who define coherence as consistency in the specific statute’s application
to like situations and across time, legislative history illuminating the
statute’s path of evolution is the better gap-filling interpretive aid.
Table 4: Individual Justices’ Rates of Reliance on Different
159
Practical Consequences Types
Justices*
(n = number of
practical
consequencesreferencing opinions
authored by each
Justice)

Administrability
Concerns

Policy
Constancy
Concerns

Both Types of
Concerns

Scalia (n = 12)

75.0%

16.7%

8.3%

Thomas (n = 7)

71.4%

28.6%

0.0%

Alito (n = 10)

70.0%

30.0%

0.0%

Roberts (n = 10)

50.0%

50.0%

0.0%

Kennedy (n = 13)

53.8%

46.2%

0.0%

Souter (n = 11)

9.1%

81.8%

9.1%

Ginsburg (n = 17)

5.9%

88.2%

5.9%

Breyer (n = 19)

26.3%

68.4%

5.3%

Stevens (n = 15)

6.7%

93.3%

0.0%

Tables 4 and 5 are particularly telling, revealing a sharp contrast
between the kinds of practical consequences that the landscape- versus
statute-specific coherence Justices tended to reference. When they
invoked practical consequences to interpret a statute, Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito employed administrability type arguments over 70%
of the time and policy constancy arguments less than one-third of the

159. * Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between the rates at which the
different Justices referenced administrability versus policy constancy practical consequences concerns
at p = .001. Not including per curiam opinions, the Justices referenced some sort of practical
consequence in 114 of their opinions in statutory cases.
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160

time.
Justices Roberts and Kennedy were less sharp in their
preferences for administrability-type concerns, referencing the two
categories of practical consequences at roughly equal rates. Statutespecific coherence Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Stevens, by contrast,
referenced policy constancy type concerns in over 80% of the cases in
which they invoked practical considerations to interpret a statute and
161
referenced administrability concerns in less than 20% of those cases.
Justice Breyer’s numbers were only slightly less stark. He referenced
policy constancy arguments in nearly 70% of the cases and
162
administrability concerns in less than one-third of the cases.
Interestingly, it appears from this data that the statute-specific coherence
Justices are more averse to administrability arguments than are the
landscape-coherence Justices to policy constancy arguments.
Table 5: Roberts Court’s Rates of Reliance on Different Practical
163
Consequences Types by Coherence Grouping (n = 117)
Justices By
Camp*
Landscape
Coherence
Justices (n = 52)
Statute-Specific
Policy
Coherence
Justices (n = 62)
Per Curiam
(n = 3)

Administrability
Concerns

Policy
Constancy
Concerns

Both Types of
Concerns

63.5%

34.6%

1.9%

12.9%

82.3%

4.8%

33.3%

66.7%

0.0%

Table 5 shows similar figures when all practical consequencesreferencing opinions authored by the landscape-coherence Justices are
grouped together (of 52 such opinions, 63.5% reference administrability
concerns and 34.6% reference policy constancy concerns), and when all
practical consequences-referencing opinions authored by the statutespecific coherence Justices are grouped together (of 62 such opinions,

160. See supra Table 4.
161. See supra Table 4.
162. See supra Table 4.
163. * Indicates chi-squared test reveals a significant difference between the rates at which the two
camps/groups of Justices referenced administrability versus policy constancy practical consequences
concerns at p < .0001. Including per curiam opinions, the Justices referenced some sort of practical
consequence in 117 of their opinions in statutory cases.
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82.3% reference policy constancy concerns, while only 12.9% reference
164
administrability concerns).
6. Statutory Subject Matter and the Interpretive Tools
In addition to the individual Justices’ rates of reliance on landscapeversus statute-specific coherence tools, I also sought to measure the
correlation, if any, between statutory subject matter and the Roberts
Court’s reliance on particular interpretive sources. Each opinion in the
dataset was coded for its subject matter according to the following
categories: (1) criminal statutes; (2) environmental statutes;
(3) jurisdictional statutes; (4) the Internal Revenue Code; (5) the Federal
Arbitration Act; (6) discrimination-related statutes; (7) the IDEA;
(8) civil RICO; (9) securities statutes; (10) antitrust statutes; (11)
preemption statutes; (12) the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA); (13) the
Bankruptcy Code; (14) immigration statutes; (15) ERISA; (16) the
Federal Communications Act; (17) the Prison Litigation Reform Act;
(18) the Patent Act; (19) the False Claims Act; (20) the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); (21) the Federal Employers
Liability Act (FELA); and (22) other statutes. It turned out that several
of these statutes/subject areas were interpreted in only a few of the
165
opinions in the dataset. In order to avoid generalizing from very small
numbers, only those statutory subject areas that were interpreted in at
least nine opinions in the dataset were included in the tables and analysis
166
below.
The results are reported in Tables 6a to 6d, 7a to 7d, and 8a to 8c.
As the tables indicate, the data suggest that the camp-transcendent
interpretive tools are also subject-matter transcendent: practical
consequences, Supreme Court precedent, the whole act rule, and
167
text/plain meaning all were referenced frequently across statute types.
“Other statutes” also was referenced frequently across statute types, with

164. See supra Table 5.
165. The dataset contained only 7 cases and 8 opinions interpreting the Internal Revenue Code; 3
cases and 8 opinions interpreting the IDEA; 6 cases and 8 opinions interpreting antitrust statutes; 2
cases and 5 opinions interpreting the FTCA; 4 cases and 3 opinions interpreting the Bankruptcy Code;
2 cases and 7 opinions interpreting the Federal Communications Act; 2 cases and 4 opinions
interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act; 3 cases and 7 opinions interpreting the Patent Act; 3
cases and 4 opinions interpreting the False Claims Act; 4 cases and 6 opinions interpreting the
AEDPA; and 2 cases and 6 opinions interpreting the FELA.
166. As Tables 6a–d, 7a–d, and 8a–c indicate, the subject areas for which correlation was assessed
were: criminal statutes (53 opinions), environmental statutes (24 opinions), jurisdictional statutes (50
opinions), the Federal Arbitration Act (11 opinions), discrimination-related statutes (49 opinions), the
civil RICO statute (9 opinions), securities statutes (9 opinions), preemption statutes (22 opinions),
immigration statutes (13 opinions), and ERISA (10 opinions).
167. See infra Tables 6a, 6b, 6c, and 6d.
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the exception of opinions interpreting environmental statutes and
168
ERISA.
The statutes that provoked the most frequent references to
169
landscape coherence interpretive tools were criminal statutes, civil
170
171
RICO, and immigration statutes. Preemption and securities statutes
also provoked notable rates of reference to two of the four landscape172
coherence tools, although the total number of opinions available for
analysis in the securities area makes it difficult to place much weight on
these figures. As for the statute-specific interpretive tools, the statutory
subject matters that provoked the most frequent rates of reference were
173
174
environmental statutes,
discrimination-related
criminal statutes,
175
176
statutes, securities statutes, and, to a lesser extent, jurisdictional
177
178
179
statutes, civil RICO, and preemption statutes.

168. See infra Table 7a.
169. Of the 53 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset involving the interpretation of a criminal
statute, 39.6% referenced other statutes, 26.4% referenced the dictionary, and 17% referenced
substantive canons. See infra Tables 7a, 7b, and 7d.
170. Of the 9 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of the civil
RICO statute, 33.3% referenced other statutes, 22.2% referenced the dictionary, and 22.2%
referenced common law precedent. See infra Tables 7a, 7b, and 7c.
171. Of the 13 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of an
immigration statute, 30.8% referenced other statutes, 23.1% referenced the dictionary, and 23.1%
referenced common law precedent. See infra Tables 7a, 7b, and 7c.
172. Twenty-two Roberts Court opinions in the dataset involved the interpretation of a
preemption statute; of these, 22.7% referenced other statutes and 22.7% referenced substantive
canons. 9 opinions from the dataset involved the interpretation of a securities statute; of these, 22.2%
referenced other statutes and 22.2% referenced common law precedent. See infra Tables 7a, 7c, and
7d.
173. The Roberts Court’s opinions interpreting criminal statutes referenced legislative history at a
rate of 30.2%, referenced intent at a rate of 24.5%, and referenced statutory purpose at a rate of 17%.
See infra Tables 8a, 8b, and 8c.
174. Of the 24 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of an
environmental statute, 20.8% referenced legislative history, 20.8% referenced intent, and 37.5%
referenced statutory purpose. See infra Tables 8a, 8b, and 8c.
175. Of the 49 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of a
discrimination-related statute, 30.6% referenced legislative history, 22.4% referenced intent, and
20.4% referenced statutory purpose. See infra Tables 8a, 8b, and 8c.
176. Of the 9 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of a securities
statute, 33.3% referenced legislative history, 33.3% referenced intent, and 44.4% referenced purpose.
See infra Tables 8a, 8b, and 8c.
177. Of the 50 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of a
jurisdictional statute, 20% referenced legislative history and 24% referenced statutory purpose. See
infra Tables 8a and 8c.
178. Of the 9 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of the civil
RICO statute, 22.2% referenced legislative history and 22.2% referenced statutory purpose. See infra
Tables 8a and 8c.
179. Of the 22 Roberts Court opinions in the dataset that involved the interpretation of a
preemption statute, 31.8% referenced intent and 40.9% referenced statutory purpose. See infra Tables
8b and 8c.
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It is difficult to generalize from these figures, but a few trends are
apparent. First, the data and tables indicate that, on the whole, the
Roberts Court tends to employ statute-specific coherence tools more
frequently than it does landscape-coherence tools when construing
environmental and discrimination-related statutes, although the Court
references one landscape-coherence tool—dictionary definitions—
180
frequently when construing environmental statutes. The same is true to
181
Conversely, landscapea lesser extent for jurisdictional statutes.
coherence tools tend to be the Court’s preferred interpretive aids when it
construes immigration statutes, although references to statutory purpose
182
also are common in the Court’s immigration opinions. Second, the
Court tends to call upon the full gamut of interpretive tools, both
183
landscape and statute-specific, when interpreting criminal statutes,
184
185
186
preemption statutes, securities statutes, and the civil RICO statute.

180. Compare Tables 8a–c (opinions interpreting environmental statutes referenced legislative
history at a rate of 20.8%, intent at a rate of 20.8%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 37.5%; opinions
interpreting discrimination-related statutes referenced legislative history at a rate of 30.6%, intent at a
rate of 22.4%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 20.4%) with Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting
environmental statutes referenced other statutes at a rate of 4.2%, dictionary definitions at a rate of
41.7%, common law precedent at a rate of 4.2%, and substantive canons at a rate of 8.3%; opinions
interpreting discrimination-related statutes referenced other statutes at a rate of 20.4%, dictionary
definitions at a rate of 10.2%, common law precedent at a rate of 6.1%, and substantive canons at a
rate of 14.3%).
181. Compare Tables 8a–c (opinions interpreting jurisdictional statutes referenced legislative
history at a rate of 20%, intent at a rate of 14%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 24%), with Tables
7a–d (opinions interpreting jurisdictional statutes referenced other statutes at a rate of 22%, dictionary
definitions at a rate of 12%, common law precedent at a rate of 6%, and substantive canons at a rate
of 8%).
182. Compare Tables 8a–c (opinions interpreting immigration statutes referenced legislative
history at a rate of 7.7%, intent at a rate of 7.7%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 30.8%), with
Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting immigration statutes referenced other statutes at a rate of 30.8%,
dictionary definitions at a rate of 23.1%, common law precedent at a rate of 23.1%, and substantive
canons at a rate of 7.7%).
183. See Tables 8a–c and Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting criminal statutes referenced legislative
history at a rate of 30.2%, intent at a rate of 24.5%, and statutory purpose at a rate of 17%; other
statutes were referenced at a rate of 39.6%, dictionary definitions at a rate of 26.4%, common law
precedent at a rate of 7.5%, and substantive canons at a rate of 17%).
184. See Tables 8a–c and Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting preemption statutes referenced
legislative history at a rate of 18.2%, intent at a rate of 31.8%, and statutory purpose at a rate of
40.9%; other statutes were referenced at a rate of 22.7%, dictionary definitions at a rate of 9.1%,
common law precedent at a rate of 9.1%, and substantive canons at a rate of 22.7%).
185. See Tables 8a–c and Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting securities statutes referenced
legislative history at a rate of 33.3%, intent at a rate of 33.3%, and statutory purpose at a rate of
44.4%; other statutes were referenced at a rate of 22.2%, dictionary definitions at a rate of 11.1%,
common law precedent at a rate of 22.2%, and substantive canons at a rate of 11.1%).
186. See Tables 8a–c and Tables 7a–d (opinions interpreting the civil RICO statute referenced
legislative history at a rate of 22.2%, intent at a rate of 11.1%, and statutory purpose at a rate of
22.2%; other statutes were referenced at a rate of 33.3%, dictionary definitions at a rate of 22.2%,
common law precedent at a rate of 22.2%, and substantive canons at a rate of 11.1%).
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Again, given the size of the dataset, it is important to focus on
overall trends rather than precise percentages. But even staying at the
big-picture level, the data about statutory subject matter is intriguing.
Why does the Roberts Court tend to employ statute-specific rather than
landscape coherence tools when interpreting environmental,
discrimination-related and, to some extent, jurisdictional statutes? It is
possible that these statutes are more complicated or are viewed as
greater breaks from the preexisting legal regime than is the average
statute; or perhaps environmental, discrimination-related, and
jurisdictional statutes have more developed legislative records and
purposes than do other statutes. Perhaps they were, on the whole,
enacted by very liberal Congresses. Future work examining the Court’s
interpretive tool reliance by statutory subject matter can and should
explore such possibilities.

III. Illustrative Case Studies
The reader might be left wondering what all of these statistics mean
on the level of the individual case. Specifically, she may question whether
the Roberts Court’s statutory cases are characterized by clean face-offs
between landscape-coherence canons in the majority opinions and
statute-specific coherence canons in the dissenting opinions, and whether
the subject matter of a statute is a definitive predictor of which
interpretive tools the Court will employ in construing the statute. The
short answer to such questions is that the statistical evidence is not nearly
so black-and-white. For one thing, the two interpretive approaches are
not always in tension—indeed, landscape- and statute-specific coherence
often both point towards and can be achieved by the same construction
187
of a statute. Further, some of the Justices exhibit crossover tendencies
to reference one or more of the opposing camp’s preferred interpretive
188
tools. And while statutory subject matter may play some role in the
Court’s choice of which interpretive aids to consult, the data reported
above hardly indicate that this role is a definitive one.
In highlighting the Justices’ interpretive divide, I do not mean to
suggest that every statutory case neatly and exclusively relies on either
legal-landscape coherence-fostering interpretive tools or statute-specific
coherence-fostering tools. My intention in this Article is merely to point
out that: (1) different interpretive canons and tools push towards
different kinds of coherence; (2) the Justices, in their common law
approach to construing statutes, very much evince an interpretive goal of

187. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1856–60 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(making both statute-specific legislative history and design arguments and landscape-focused common
law and substantive canon arguments).
188. See Tables 2 and 3 and discussion supra Part II.C.5.
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creating coherence in the law, whether in the legal landscape writ large
or in the specific policy of the individual statute; and (3) when landscapecoherence oriented interpretive tools point to a different interpretation
than do the interpretive tools that focus on the specific statute at issue,
the Justices are likely to split along fairly identifiable lines in their
statutory constructions. This Part examines a few non-unanimous cases
from the dataset to illustrate how the Court’s interpretive divide works in
practice.
A. LIMTIACO V. CAMACHO
189

The first example, Limtiaco v. Camacho, is a 2006 Term case in
which the Court divided 5-4 over the proper interpretation of the debt190
limitation provision of the Organic Act of Guam. The Guam legislature
had authorized Guam’s governor to issue bonds to fund the territory’s
191
continuing debt obligations. Guam’s attorney general refused to sign
off on the bond contracts, arguing that the bond issuance would violate
the debt-limitation provision of the Act, which limits the territory’s
public indebtedness to 10% of the “aggregate tax valuation of the
192
property in Guam.” The statutory question before the Supreme Court
was whether Guam’s debt limitation must be calculated according to the
193
assessed or to the appraised valuation of property in Guam. A divided
Court ruled that the debt-limitation must be calculated based on the
194
assessed valuation.
Justice Thomas’s opinion, joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Breyer, relied heavily on landscape-coherence oriented
interpretive tools to reach and justify its construction of the statute. First,
he referenced Black’s Law Dictionary—an external, non-statute-specific
source of legal definitions and custom—to determine that “‘tax
valuation’ most naturally means the value to which the tax rate is
195
applied[,]” which in turn translates to the “‘assessed valuation,’ a term
consistently defined as a valuation of property for purposes of
196
taxation.” The Court also tied a plain-meaning argument to its
dictionary references, holding that the term tax valuation “most naturally
197
means the value to which the tax rate is applied.”

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

549 U.S. 483 (2007).
48 U.S.C. § 1423a (2006); 11 Guam Code Ann. § 24102 (1998).
Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 485.
48 U.S.C. § 1423a; Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 485.
Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 489
Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1721, 149 (4th ed. 1951)).
Id.
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The Court then made a second classic legal-landscape oriented
interpretive move, arguing that “[o]ur interpretation comports with most
States’ practice of tying the debt limitations of municipalities to assessed
valuation,” and that “[s]tates that depart from the majority approach use
198
clear language to do so.” In other words, the Court chose to interpret
the statute in the manner most consistent with existing legal practice,
emphasizing that its chosen construction fit snugly alongside the other
pieces of the legal landscape puzzle (or, most states’ practices).
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Alito, took a classically statute-specific interpretive approach. The
dissent disagreed with the majority’s argument that the term “tax
valuation” unambiguously referred to the assessed value and contended
199
that it, therefore, was proper to consult the statute’s purpose.
Congress’s purpose in enacting the debt limitation, the dissent argued,
was to restrict the Guam government’s ability to incur “crushing”
amounts of debt that would be shouldered by future generations and
200
ultimately, could require a bailout from the United States government.
Combining purpose with practical consequence considerations, the
dissent concluded that the only construction that could fulfill the statute’s
policy objectives was one that tied the debt limitation to Guam’s capacity
201
to tax property—that is, appraised or market value. The dissent made
the practical observation that “[t]he actual, market value of property is
the only economic index of Guam’s ability to collect property taxes to
pay its bills, the only figure under consideration that is fixed in the real
202
world, and the only figure that provides a genuine limitation.” Further,
the dissent hypothesized that because assessed value is determined based
on the tax rate set by the Guam legislature, an interpretation that tied
the debt-limitation to the assessed value would enable the Guam
legislature to manipulate the tax rate in order to affect the assessed
203
valuation and hence, to manipulate the debt limit. In other words, the
practical consequences of the majority’s interpretation would be to
render the debt limitation provision meaningless—a classic policy
constancy-type practical consequences argument. Thus, while the
majority opinion looked outward to common state practice and
conventional legal definitions to give meaning to the statute at issue, the
dissent looked inward to the purpose of the individual statute and to

198. Id. at 491 (emphasis added) (citing 15 E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations
§ 41:7, at 422, 424–25 (3d ed. rev. 2005)).
199. Id. at 492 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 495.
201. See id. at 495–96.
202. Id. at 496.
203. Id. at 495.

Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete)

264

1/13/2011 10:43 AM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:221

practical realities, suggesting that the majority’s interpretation was likely
to render the statute’s policy hollow.
Given the trajectories taken by the majority and dissenting opinions
and the individual Justices’ preferences for particular interpretive tools,
Justice Alito’s crossover to join the policy-coherence-focused dissenting
opinion is not surprising. At least based on his rates of reliance in the
opinions he authored, Justice Alito seems to consider statutory purpose
204
an important interpretive resource. Justice Breyer’s crossover vote to
join the landscape-coherence focused majority opinion is a little more
surprising, though not incomprehensible, as the data in Table 2 indicate
some inclination on his part to reference dictionary definitions in the
205
opinions he authors.
B. RAPANOS V. UNITED STATES
206

The second case study is Rapanos v. United States, a 2006 case in
which the Court splintered by a 4-1-4 margin in construing the Clean
207
Water Act (CWA). Michigan landowner John Rapanos backfilled
208
wetlands on a parcel of land that he owned. The Army Corps of
Engineers, which administers much of the CWA, informed Mr. Rapanos
that his wetlands were “waters of the United States” and could not be
209
backfilled without a permit. The CWA makes it unlawful to discharge
210
certain material into “navigable waters” without a permit and defines
“navigable waters” as “the waters of the United States, including the
211
territorial seas.” The Army Corps had, for years, interpreted “waters of
the United States” expansively to include not only traditional navigable
waters, but also “tributaries” and wetlands “adjacent” to navigable
212
waters and tributaries. The Supreme Court had to decide whether Mr.
Rapanos’s wetlands, which lay near ditches or man-made drains that
eventually emptied into traditional navigable waters, constituted “waters
213
of the United States” within the meaning of the CWA. The members of
the Roberts Court split three ways, with a plurality concluding that the
214
statute did not cover Mr. Rapanos’s wetlands.
Writing for four members of the Court, Justice Scalia placed
significant emphasis on giving the CWA an interpretation that fit
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See supra Table 2.
Id.
547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opinion).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1444 (2006).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719–20.
Id. at 720–21 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
Id. § 1362(7).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 727–28.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 731–32.
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coherently into the existing legal landscape and almost no emphasis on
215
the specific statutory policy internal to the CWA. His plurality opinion
referred extensively to dictionary definitions indicating that the statutory
term “the waters” means “water ‘[a]s found in streams and bodies
forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’ or ‘the
flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams
216
or bodies.’” All of these dictionary terms, he observed, “connote
continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily dry
217
channels through which water occasionally or intermittently flows.”
Justice Scalia reinforced his reliance on the conventional meaning
provided in dictionaries with a reference to how the term “navigable
waters” had been interpreted in other statutes: He noted that the CWA
adopted the “traditional phrase ‘navigable waters’” from its predecessor
218
statutes and that the traditional understanding of “navigable waters” in
219
those statutes included only discrete bodies of water. Justice Scalia
supported this latter point by citing Supreme Court precedents that used
the terms “waters” and “rivers” interchangeably and used “navigable
waters” to mean “waterways,” arguing that “because such ‘waters’ had to
be navigable in fact or susceptible of being rendered so, the term [could]
220
not include ephemeral flows.” He also made a whole-act-rule argument
emphasizing that the CWA itself characterizes the channels and conduits
that typically carry intermittent flows of water—like the tributaries and
wetlands at issue—as “point sources” separate and distinct from
221
“navigable waters.” This separate internal classification, he argued,
further showed that the watercourses through which intermittent waters
222
typically flow are not “waters of the United States.”
Having covered the immediately adjacent legal landscape
(dictionary conventions, past precedent, other statutes, other sections of
the same statute), Justice Scalia next looked to ensure that the Court’s
interpretation remained consistent with the overarching legal framework.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary 2882
(2d ed. 1954)).
217. Id. at 733 & n.6.
The principal definition of ‘stream’ likewise includes reference to such permanent,
geographically fixed bodies of water: ‘[a] current or course of water or other fluid, flowing
on the earth, as a river, brook, etc.’ The other definitions of ‘stream’ repeatedly emphasize
the requirement of continuous flow: ‘[a] steady flow, as of water, air, gas, or the like’;
‘[a]nything issuing or moving with continued succession of parts’; ‘[a] continued current or
course; current; drift.’
Id. (internal citations omitted).
218. Id. at 734.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 735 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006)).
222. Id. at 735–36.
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He noted that serious constitutional issues involving the Commerce
Clause and federalism would arise if the CWA were interpreted to give
223
the Army Corps’ authority over intermittent water flows. The Court’s
precedents established that the “[r]egulation of land use” is a
224
and that states possess
“quintessential state and local power,”
225
“traditional and primary power over land and water use.” Only a
narrow reading of the Army Corps’ regulatory authority would be
consistent with the states’ primacy in this area; the Corps’ expansive
definition would make it “a de facto regulator of immense stretches of
226
intrastate land” and eliminate “virtually all” state and local planning,
227
intruding impermissibly on state governments’ authority. Thus, both
the avoidance canon and federalism clear-statement rules dictated that
the Court should interpret the regulatory power conferred by the statute
narrowly, so as not to disrupt the existing constitutional balance between
228
federal and state power.
Justice Scalia’s opinion also contained a passing reference to the
practical consequences worked by the Corps’ expansive interpretation.
The opinion began by detailing the burden placed on landowners under
existing regulations, implying that the current system is prohibitively
229
“The average applicant for an
expensive and time-consuming.
individual permit,” Justice Scalia noted, “spends 788 days and $271,596
in completing the process,” and “[o]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by
230
the private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits.” These are
administrability-based practical concerns, suggesting that the statutory
question at issue was part of a larger problem with a regulatory
landscape that was unduly burdensome and inefficient. Although this
data about the costs landowners face in applying for a permit appears in
the background facts section of the plurality opinion, rather than its
231
statutory analysis section, the fact that the opinion mentions these costs
at all—even providing hard numbers—indicates that they formed at least
part of the plurality’s interpretive calculus.

223. See id. at 738.
224. Id. (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982); Hess v. Port Auth. TransHudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)).
225. Id. (quoting Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001)).
226. Id. (emphasis omitted).
227. Id. at 737–38.
228. Id. at 738 (citing BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994); Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
229. See id. at 721.
230. Id. (citing David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation
by Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 Nat. Resources
J. 59, 74–76, 81 (2002)).
231. Id. at 719–22.
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Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion was landscape-oriented in three
important ways. First, it looked to external sources, including
conventional dictionary meanings, other statutes, and Supreme Court
232
precedents, to give meaning to the statutory term “navigable waters.”
Second, it relied on background rules directing that the CWA should be
read narrowly in order to avoid bumping up incongruously against the
233
constitutional structure. Third, it pointed to evidence suggesting that
234
the regulatory landscape was unduly burdensome and unworkable. For
Justice Scalia and the other members of the plurality, the policy
underlying the individual statute took a backseat to concerns about how
the interpretation chosen by the Court would square with the meaning
given to other statutes containing the term “navigable waters,” the
constitutional backdrop, and the permitting and regulatory system.
Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in the case but refused to
235
join Justice Scalia’s heavily landscape-oriented opinion. Instead, he
authored a concurring opinion that exhibited significant crossover
reliance on statute-specific coherence-focused interpretive tools. Rather
than look to external dictionary definitions to provide a universal
meaning for “waters,” Justice Kennedy argued that the appropriate test
for whether a wetland constitutes “navigable waters” was the one
established in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. Army
Corps of Engineers, a prior Supreme Court case interpreting the same
236
statutory language. In Solid Waste, the Court held that in order to fall
within the Corps’ regulatory authority, ponds and mudflats must possess
a “significant nexus” to waters that are navigable in fact or that could
237
In Justice Kennedy’s view, this
reasonably be made navigable.
“significant nexus” test was the established rule and should be applied to
238
wetlands as well.
Justice Kennedy also referenced the CWA’s statutory purpose,
observing that “Congress enacted the law to ‘restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,’” and
that the rationale for including wetlands is that wetlands “can perform
239
He
critical functions related to the integrity of other waters.”
contended that wetlands should be deemed to possess the requisite
“nexus” and thus, to come within the statutory phrase “navigable
waters” if they “significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supra notes 216, 218, 219 and accompanying text.
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (citing 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001)).
531 U.S. at 167.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759, 767.
Id. at 779 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)).
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240

integrity of other covered waters . . . understood as ‘navigable.’”
Because the lower courts failed to apply the “significant nexus” test to
determine whether Mr. Rapanos’s wetlands fell within the CWA’s
241
coverage, Justice Kennedy argued that the case should be remanded.
For Justice Kennedy, maintaining a consistent policy across time with
respect to the test for “navigable waters” and ensuring that the term was
applied in a manner consistent with the CWA’s purpose were more
important considerations than ensuring that the term “navigable waters”
be construed consistently across the United States Code or with minimal
constitutional side effects.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion also criticized the plurality
242
He argued that the
opinion for producing an absurd result.
“permanent” or “continuous flow” reading of “navigable waters” made
“little practical sense,” because it meant that “[t]he merest trickle, if
continuous, would count as a ‘water’ subject to federal regulation, while
torrents thundering at irregular intervals through otherwise dry channels
243
would not.” Justice Kennedy went on to give real-world examples of
rivers that might not be counted as “navigable waters” under the
244
This is a classic policy constancy practical
plurality’s reasoning.
consequences argument, faulting the plurality’s interpretation for
producing a nonsensical statutory policy.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion shows that there was more
than mere results-focused decisionmaking at work in Rapanos. He
reached the same outcome as the plurality opinion—no Army Corps
245
jurisdiction over the wetlands at issue —but based on very different
interpretive tools and a very different interpretive focus. Moreover, he
did so in a manner quite consistent with the interpretive tool preferences
reflected in Table 2. He references statutory purpose and Supreme Court
precedent, interpreting the same statutory provision in a slightly different
context.
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer, Souter, and
Ginsburg, focused on the consistency of the CWA’s specific policy over
time, invoking four statute-specific coherence-fostering interpretive
tools. First, the dissent argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in a
246
prior case, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc, had decided
the precise question at issue, dictating that the CWA “authorizes the
Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from the Corps before

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 780.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 769.
Id.
Id. at 769–70.
Id. at 734 (plurality opinion).
474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of
247
water and their tributaries.” That opinion, the dissent insisted, nowhere
limited the covered wetlands to those containing a continuous
248
Second, the dissent
connection to permanent bodies of water.
referenced the CWA’s legislative history to argue that the Army Corps’
expansive interpretation of “navigable waters” had been ratified by
249
Congress decades ago. The legislative history showed that Congress, in
1977, considered and rejected an amendment that would have narrowed
250
the scope of the Army Corps’ asserted jurisdiction; in the dissent’s
view, this was powerful evidence that Congress deliberately acquiesced
in the Army Corps’ interpretation of “navigable waters” to include
251
wetlands. Third, the dissent criticized the plurality for casting aside the
Army Corps’ longstanding regulatory policy, noting that the rejected
252
interpretation reflected “30 years of practice by the Army Corps.”
Fourth, the dissent listed some of the practical ways in which wetlands
can improve water quality and argued that the plurality opinion would
253
result in arbitrary practical distinctions. For example, Justice Stevens
noted,
Under the plurality’s view, then, the Corps can regulate polluters who
dump dredge into a stream that flows year round but may not be able
to regulate polluters who dump into a neighboring stream that flows
for only 290 days of the year—even if the dredge in this second stream
would have the same effect on downstream waters as the dredge in the
254
year-round one.

This last argument expresses a policy constancy-type practical
consequences concern that the plurality’s interpretation will result in an
incoherent statutory policy.
Justice Stevens’s dissent also criticized the plurality opinion for
ignoring the specific purpose and intent of the CWA and for misusing
255
dictionary definitions. He quoted Supreme Court precedent stating
that the CWA was “not merely another law” and that “Congress’ intent
in enacting the [CWA] was clearly to establish an all-encompassing
256
program of water pollution regulation . . . .” The plurality’s interpretation,

247. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Riverside
Bayview, 474 U.S. at 123 (1985)).
248. Id. at 806.
249. Id. at 797.
250. Id. at 794.
251. Id. at 797.
252. Id. at 788.
253. Id. at 800.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 804–05.
256. Id. at 804 (quoting Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317, 318 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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257

he lamented, undermined this fundamental statutory policy. Finally,
Justice Stevens’s dissent, like Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion,
argued that the plurality’s reliance on dictionary definitions was spotty—
ignoring, for example, the dictionary’s treatment of “streams” as
“waters,” and the fact that streams can be “intermittent” as well as
258
“perennial.” Significantly, Justice Stevens employed these landscapeoriented dictionary definitions only to rebut the plurality opinion’s
259
dictionary use, not as an interpretive aid in their own right.
The various opinions in Rapanos provide a classic illustration of the
Roberts Court’s interpretive divide, with the Justices in either camp
facing off squarely over legal-landscape versus individual statute-specific
coherence concerns. Only Justice Kennedy was caught in the middle,
joining the landscape-coherence Justices in outcome but writing an
opinion that relied heavily on purpose—an interpretive tool for which he
exhibits a relatively high rate of reliance in Table 2—and other statutespecific coherence-fostering interpretive resources.

IV. Theoretical Implications of the Coherence Divide
The coherence divide identified in this Article raises several
intriguing theoretical questions. Part IV.A compares landscape
coherence and statute-specific coherence to theories of statutory
interpretation espoused by some of the Justices in their opinions and
extra-judicial writings. Part IV.B discusses the ideological implications of
the coherence divide.
A. Not Just Old Wine in New Bottles
The interpretive divide described in this Article should not sound
entirely foreign to those familiar with the Supreme Court’s interpretive
methodologies. Indeed, some hint of the divide is plainly discernable in
at least two of the Justices’ comments about the interpretive process.
Justice Scalia has stated that when interpreting statutes, the members of
the Court should “look for a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed
260
Justice Stevens,
alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”
conversely, has expressed the view that the Court should interpret
statutes in a manner that avoids statutory incoherence:

257. Id.
258. Id. at 801. The dissent established this latter fact through references to topographical map
symbols provided by the Department of the Interior. Id.
259. Id. at 801, 805 (rebutting the plurality’s dictionary use regarding the word “stream,” and citing
the dictionary definition of “adjacent” to rebut the plurality’s definition of the word).
260. Scalia, supra note 1, at 17.
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There are occasions when an exclusive focus on text seems to convey
an incoherent message, but other reliable evidence clarifies the statute
and avoids the apparent incoherence. In such a case . . . we should
never permit a narrow focus on text to obscure a commonsense
261
appraisal of that additional evidence.

But despite some points of overlap, these two Justices’ comments about
how statutes should be interpreted do not square on all fours with either
the landscape-coherence or the statute-specific coherence approaches to
statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s description focuses far more on
what the reasonable person, or “objective” reader, would make of the
statute’s text than on the meaning dictated by the common law,
substantive canons, or other federal statutes. Indeed, he criticizes
262
reliance on substantive canons, though such reliance is an important
part of the landscape coherence approach. Moreover, he suggests that
the corpus juris is secondary to the text in statutory construction; but in
practice, many landscape-coherence Justices have proved willing to trim
back a statute’s apparent textual meaning to avoid constitutional
problems or to maintain consistency with the interpretation given to
263
other similar statutes. In short, Justice Scalia’s description of the ideal
interpretive practice fails to acknowledge—or to justify—how much
judicial puzzle-working and harmonization between various pieces of the
existing legal backdrop is involved in the landscape-coherence approach.
Justice Stevens’s proffered approach similarly fails to map precisely
onto the actual practice of the statute-specific coherence camp. First,
Justice Stevens aims all of his fire at textualism, arguing that rigid
adherence to the statute’s text is improper when it results in an
incoherent message. In so defining the methodological battle, he
completely ignores the role that landscape-coherence concerns—which
emphasize avoiding incoherence in the legal system writ large—can play

261. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 472 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 28–29 (“To the honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and
presumptions are a lot of trouble. . . . But . . . there is also the question of where the courts get the
authority to impose them.”).
263. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513 (2009)
(explaining that construing the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to allow this utility district to bail out would
raise serious constitutional concerns, and that the Court will not interpret a statute in a way that
creates constitutional difficulties if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case);
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1237 (2009) (explaining that reading § 2 of the VRA to require
crossover districts would raise serious equal protection concerns by forcing courts to make inquiries
based on racial classifications and race-based predictions, and that to the extent there is doubt about
whether § 2 of the VRA requires crossover districts, the Court must resolve that doubt by avoiding the
interpretation that raises serious constitutional concerns); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153
(2007) (“The canon of constitutional avoidance, finally, extinguishes any lingering doubt as to whether
the Act covers the prototypical D&E procedure. ‘[T]he elementary rule is that every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’” (quoting
Edward J DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988))).
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in taking the interpreter’s focus off of the individual statute and its
specific message. Second, and relatedly, Justice Stevens justifies his
preferred approach primarily through the argument that Congress should
be presumed to act coherently when drafting and enacting statutes.
Indeed, he considers it “disrespectful” to Congress not to make such an
264
assumption. But this focus on coherent congressional behavior ignores
the fact that the Justices in the statute-specific coherence camp often rely
on factors unconnected to Congress’s actions when construing statutes—
for example, the Court’s own precedents interpreting the statute, the
justness of a particular interpretation, or other practical consequences
likely to result from the interpretation. Thus, while Justice Scalia’s and
Justice Stevens’s remarks about the proper interpretive methodology
touch on some of the important points of departure between the legal
landscape and statute-specific coherence camps, they do not get to the
bottom of what separates these two interpretive approaches: a focus on
ensuring seamlessness with the rest of the legal landscape for landscapecoherence Justices versus a focus on the specific statute at issue and the
consistency and coherence of its individual policy for statute-specific
coherence Justices.
Hints of the statute-specific coherence approach also can be found
in the longstanding interpretive methodologies referred to as
purposivism and intentionalism. Purposivism instructs courts to choose
265
the interpretation that best carries out a statute’s purpose; courts
typically identify the statute’s purpose from its text, legislative history,
prior judicial interpretations, or other background information, such as
266
267
the “mischief” the statute was designed to correct. Intentionalism
directs the interpreter to identify and follow the original intent of the
statute’s drafters—to ask how the enacting Congress would have decided
268
Both
the question—and to construe the statute accordingly.

264. See Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 467, 469 (“If we assume that [the two sponsors] correctly understood
their work product, the provision is coherent. . . . [T]he Court’s cavalier treatment of the explanations
of the statute provided . . . by [the sponsors] is disrespectful, not only to those Senators, but to the
entire Senate as well. For . . . it apparently assumes that the Senators were either dissembling or
unable to understand the meaning of the bill that they were sponsoring.”).
265. See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 1374 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
266. See, e.g., Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Engl. Rep. 637 (describing the “Mischief Rule”).
267. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 62 (2007) (gleaning the Fair Credit
Reporting Act’s “objective” from its statement of purpose); Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 154
(2007) (identifying “streamlining federal habeas proceedings” as the AEDPA’s “goal” based on prior
judicial interpretation of the AEDPA (citing Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005))); S.D.
Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 380 (2006) (determining the purpose of § 401 of
the CWA based on statements in the relevant senate committee report); see also Jerome Frank, Words
and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 1259, 1269–70 (1947); Max
Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 388, 398–99 (1942).
268. See, e.g., Eskridge et al., supra note 102, at 690; Posner, supra note 3, at 286–87; Pound,
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interpretive theories proceed from the premise that Congress is the
principal, or master, and that courts are its agents, or servants, charged
with faithful execution of the enacting legislature’s underlying policy
269
objectives (purposivism) or specific intent (intentionalism). Because
both theories emphasize statutory purpose, legislative history, and
legislative intent as interpretive guides, they may appear upon initial,
superficial glance to equate with the approach taken by the statutespecific coherence Justices.
But there are important differences between the statute-specific
coherence approach and the traditional purposive and intentionalist
approaches. Purposivism and intentionalism place primary emphasis on
the enacting Congress—either in terms of the policy objectives it
established or in terms of its expectations regarding the application of
270
the statute to the specific situation at issue. The statute-specific
coherence approach, by contrast, places primary emphasis on selecting
an interpretation that: (1) maintains internal statutory consistency, in the
sense of ensuring that the statute’s various sections fit together sensibly,
and that the meaning given to the provision at issue aligns with prior
judicial interpretations of the statute; and (2) produces coherent policy
consequences, in the sense that the interpretive rule established is fair,
271
non-arbitrary, and not absurd. These differences translate to the

supra note 3, at 381 (“[The interpreter’s role is] to find out directly what the law-maker meant by
assuming his position, in the surroundings in which he acted, and endeavoring to gather from the
mischiefs he had to meet and the remedy by which he sought to meet them, his intention with respect
to the particular point in controversy.”).
269. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 325 (1990); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 12–13 (2001).
270. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., supra note 32, at 1480; Eskridge Jr., supra note 4, at 626; Note,
Looking to Statutory Intertext: Toward the Use of the Rabbinic Biblical Interpretive Stance in American
Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1456, 1470–71 (2002).
271. An example may help make the differences between these approaches more concrete. In
Dada v. Mukasey, the Court confronted an immigration statute that contained a provision granting
every alien facing a court order for removal from the country the right to file one motion to reopen his
or her removal proceedings. 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2310 (2008). A different provision of the same statute
authorized aliens facing removal to request permission to depart the country voluntarily, in lieu of
forcible removal, and if the voluntary departure request was granted, the statute required the alien to
depart the country within sixty days. Id. The alien in the case requested and was granted voluntary
departure. Id. at 2311. He also filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings based on certain
changed factual circumstances, including his marriage to an American citizen. Id. By the time his
voluntary departure date arrived, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had not ruled on his
motion to reopen. Id. The alien, accordingly, sought to withdraw his voluntary departure request and
to remain in the country pending a decision on his motion to reopen. Id. at 2312. The statutory issue
was whether an alien who has requested and received permission to depart voluntarily may withdraw
his request and remain in the country in order to obtain a ruling on a motion to reopen his removal
proceedings. Id.
A purposive interpretive approach would have dictated that the Court must identify the
underlying objective of the immigration statute, or at least of the motion to reopen and/or voluntary
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interpretive tool level: Purposivism focuses first and foremost on
interpretive references to statutory purpose, while intentionalism focuses
272
first and foremost on references to legislative intent. Neither traditional
approach contemplates significant reliance on Supreme Court precedent
or the practical consequences of a particular interpretation, since neither
of those interpretive tools sheds light on the enacting Congress’s
objectives or intent. The statute-specific coherence approach, by
contrast, relies substantively on both Supreme Court precedent and
practical consequences—and as the data in Table 2 shows, the Camp
Two Justices exhibit high rates of reliance on both of these interpretive
273
tools.
B. Ideology and the Coherence Divide
Interestingly, the dividing line between the two interpretive camps
tracks rather neatly the liberal-conservative ideological divide, with the
Court’s conservative Justices tending towards landscape coherence and
274
the Court’s liberal Justices tending towards statute-specific coherence.
The reasons for this correlation are unclear, but several potential
275
explanations come to mind. One possibility, as noted earlier, is that
Justice Scalia, who has been outspoken in his views about the illegitimacy
of certain interpretative tools, namely, legislative history, purpose, and
276
intent, has influenced the other conservative Justices to adopt his
interpretive approach. But if so, his influence has been incomplete—he
departure provisions, and that the Court must decide the statutory question in the manner that best
complied with the objective the statute was designed to achieve; an intentionalist approach would have
directed the Court to attempt to divine how the enacting Congress would have resolved the issue. Yet
the majority, composed of statute-specific coherence Justices plus crossover Justice Kennedy, made no
mention whatsoever of the enacting Congress’s intent and barely mentioned the statute’s purpose. See
id. at 2318 (including two sentences, in passing, about statute’s purpose). Instead, it relied on the
practical consequences that would arise from a decision not to permit the alien to withdraw his
voluntary departure request. See id at 2317–18 (calling it “untenable” to force aliens to make a “Scylla
and Charibdys” choice between the right to file a motion to reopen and the provision requiring
voluntary departure within sixty days, noting the practical reality that it often takes longer than the
voluntary departure period for a motion to reopen to be decided, and decrying the unjustness of
allowing a particular BIA member’s backlog to determine whether an alien who has filed for both
forms of relief gets to have his motion to reopen reviewed), and on inferences from the statute’s
structure (the whole act rule) to conclude that the most sensible construction was one that permitted
the alien to withdraw his voluntary departure motion. See id. at 2317 (noting that the way to make
sense of and give meaning to both the motion to reopen and the voluntary departure provision was to
allow the alien to withdraw a request for voluntary departure if necessary to obtain a ruling on his
motion to reopen).
272. See Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 269, at 325–26, 332–33; Bradford C. Mank, Legal
Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 815, 818–19 (2002);
Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 225, 227 (1999).
273. See supra Table 2.
274. See supra Tables 2, 3.
275. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
276. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 3–37.
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has not, for example, convinced Justices Kennedy or Alito to avoid
277
referencing statutory purpose or legislative intent. Moreover, there are
four Justices with crossover potential between the two statutory
interpretation camps, but only one of these—Justice Kennedy—is
278
considered a swing, or potential crossover, voter on ideology. Indeed,
the statutory interpretation methodology preferences of Justices Alito,
Souter, and Ginsburg seem difficult to explain based purely on
279
ideology.
A second possibility is that the landscape versus statute-specific
coherence divide reflects differences in conservative versus liberal views
about the separation of powers and the proper role of the judiciary in
reviewing legislative enactments. Our constitutional system is built on
the premise that the best way to safeguard against tyranny is to separate
the powers of government among three branches, so that each branch
280
checks the other two. The Founders believed that although this system
of checks and balances might at times paralyze the processes of
government and thwart the public will, such paralysis was a worthwhile
281
price to pay to prevent legislative despotism. Madison, Hamilton, and
others even viewed the checks and balances as necessary brakes that
would guard against impulsive legislation and ensure that only the best
282
proposals would make it past the vetting process into law.

277. See supra Tables 2, 3.
278. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and
the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 41 (2009) (“The Court routinely splits five to four in cases of
political import, with Justice Kennedy as the swing voter.”).
279. As explained above, I attempted in this study to assess the correlation between ideology and
canon use, but the small sample size of 166 cases and 352 opinions generated numbers for the
correlation between ideology and each interpretive tool that were too small from which to reach
reliable observations. See supra Table 2. During the 2005–2008 Terms, each Justice authored
somewhere between 30 and 48 opinions and most interpretive tools were referenced at a rate of
somewhere between 20 and 40%; thus, the number of opinions available to be assessed for correlation
between a particular interpretive tool and ideology often was at or below fifteen. Id.
280. See The Federalist No. 51, at 347–49 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961).
281. See The Federalist No. 73, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961).
It may perhaps be said, that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing
good ones; and may be used to the one purpose as well as to the other. But this objection
will have little weight . . . The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good
laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.
Id.
282. See The Federalist No. 73, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961).
The [secondary] inducement to conferring the [veto] power . . . upon the executive . . . is to
increase the chances . . . against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or
design. The oftener a measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in the
situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which
flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the contagion
of some common passion or interest.
Id.

Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete)

276

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/13/2011 10:43 AM

[Vol. 62:221

In the post-New Deal era, however, the lines between the different
branches of government have blurred somewhat, as party allegiances
283
have replaced institutional ones and administrative agencies with
284
allegiances to both the executive and legislative branches have come to
285
play a significant role in implementing statutes. Moreover, legislative
and executive branch powers have expanded exponentially, as has the
286
role of the federal government in regulating private and social spheres.
In the wake of these changes, it may be the case—as foreshadowed by
FDR’s battle with the conservative members of the Supreme Court
287
during the New Deal’s early years —that conservative Justices,
preferring limited government and limited federal regulation, have found
it increasingly necessary to cabin the reach of ambitious legislation when
interpreting statutes. That is, Justices with conservative political views
may, as an ideological matter, be more wary than their liberal
counterparts of congressional overreaching. Conservative Justices,
therefore, consider it their role to check a statute’s meaning against
established external sources such as the dictionary, the common law,
prior judicial interpretations of related statutes, and other statutes
enacted, in most cases, by earlier legislatures. Relatedly, they may be
disinclined to interpret a statute’s text with reference to the
283. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 Harv. L. Rev. 2312 (2006).
284. See, e.g., Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in
Federal Rulemaking, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1257, 1305 & nn.270–71 (2006); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2298 (2001); Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules
for Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 845, 850
(2004).
285. See, e.g., Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and
the Legislative Process 4, 46 (1997); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered
Administrative Law? A Dialogue With Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 Admin. L.
Rev. 889, 903 (2007); see also Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(requiring courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutes).
286. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, The Power to Legislate 57 (2006); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1727, 1819–20 (1996); Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism
Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 475, 489 (2002); Gary Lawson, The
Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1236 (1994); Gillian E. Metzger,
Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 508 n.104
(2010).
287. During the early years of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s presidency, the Court struck down several
of his most ambitious New Deal statutes on the grounds that they violated the Constitution’s
separation of powers. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (“[O]ur Constitution
prohibits the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The act . . . is a statutory plan to
regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal
government.”); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935)
(invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act as an impermissible delegation of legislative power
to the executive branch); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 368 (1935) (invalidating the
Railroad Retirement Act as exceeding Congress’s power to regulate commerce). The rulings
prompted FDR to retaliate with his infamous “court-packing” plan. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The
Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court Packing” Plan, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 347, 348.
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untrustworthy, power-grabbing legislature’s intent, purpose, or
extraneous musings in the legislative history. Liberal Justices, by
contrast, may be more trusting of legislatures and more sympathetic,
ideologically, to legislative and executive attempts to accomplish social
policy change through legislation. As a consequence, Justices with a
liberal political ideology may be desirous, rather than wary, of
implementing the legislature’s underlying will when interpreting a statute
and thus, inclined to seek out evidence of what the legislature intended
for a statute to accomplish when determining the extent of that statute’s
reach.
Frank Easterbrook’s old position in Statutes’ Domains may also be
relevant to the coherence divide. Easterbrook famously expressed a
preference for cabining the reach of statutes and warned of the dangers
produced when jurists interpret a statute to achieve more than the
legislators who bargained and compromised over its provisions
288
intended. “If the court always responds to the invocation of [a] statute
by attempting to read the minds of its framers and supply ‘more in the
same vein,’ and makes its share of errors,” Easterbrook argued, “every
one of [those errors] will carry the statute to where costs exceed
289
benefits.” In Easterbrook’s view, fulfillment of a statute’s policy to the
290
utmost thus should not be the goal of the statutory interpreter. Rather,
“the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its
291
framers and expressly resolved in the legislative process.” Where no
express legislative resolution has been made, Easterbrook advocated that
the court should “hold the matter in question outside the statute’s
domain. The statute [sh]ould become irrelevant, [and] parties (and court)
292
remitted to whatever other sources of law might be applicable.”
There are noteworthy parallels between Easterbrook’s formulation
and the landscape-coherence approach, which looks to sources of law
external to the statute at issue to determine the statute’s meaning and
eschews interpretive tools that seek to “read the minds” of the statute’s
framers. Landscape-coherence Justices rely on common law precedent,
other statutes, conventional word meanings supplied by dictionaries, and
substantive canons based on constitutional or background legal norms,
rather than on a statute’s goals or internal history to give meaning to the
statute’s provisions. In this way, the landscape-coherence Justices are in a
sense following Easterbrook’s directive that, absent clear legislative
resolution of the precise question at issue, “the statute [sh]ould become
irrelevant, [and] parties (and court) remitted to whatever other sources
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 540–41 (1983).
Id. at 541.
Id. at 533–34.
Id. at 544.
Id.

Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete)

278

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/13/2011 10:43 AM

[Vol. 62:221

293

of law might be applicable.” This makes sense because the conservative
Justices’ resistance to statute-specific coherence seems grounded in
concerns similar to those expressed by Easterbrook. For example,
reliance on “more in the same vein” interpretive sources such as
statutory purpose and legislative intent will lead to extreme statutory
applications that lack balance and that pursue the policy of one law to
294
the exclusion of all others. Moreover, the landscape-coherence Justices
and Easterbrook seem to share an underlying view of the common law as
295
superior to legislature-made statutes.
Third, and related to the above, it is worth noting that for most of
the past seventy years, the Democratic Party has controlled Congress,
presumably leading to disproportionate enactment of statutes with
liberal purposes and intents and to legislative history reflecting the views
of liberal senators and representatives. It is possible that Congress’s
political composition during this period has played some role in the
conservative Justices’ aversion to statutory purpose, intent, and
legislative history as interpretive tools and, conversely, has led these
Justices to place greater emphasis on external legal norms, including the
precedents of an increasingly conservative Court. In other words, if
Congress had been controlled by the Republican Party for the past
several decades, then perhaps the Roberts Court’s conservative Justices
would be less dismissive of statutory purpose, intent, and legislative
history, and more skeptical of the external legal landscape—as a crutch
holding back desirable change—in their interpretive methodologies. This
third possible explanation, at least, is somewhat measurable by
comparing the conservative Justices’ rates of reference to purpose,
intent, and legislative history when the statute at issue was enacted by a
Republican-controlled, versus a Democratic-controlled Congress. Future
work organized around the statutes at issue and the political make up of
the Congresses that enacted them should seek to measure more deeply
such correlations between ideology and the Court’s statutory
296
interpretation methodology.

293. Id.
294. See id. at 543 (“The dominant purpose of some labor laws is to curb what is seen as the
excessive power of employers over their workers; the dominant purpose of others is to curb what is
seen as the excessive power of unions. What is a court to do when the union invokes one, the employer
invokes another, and each asks the court to determine the case by construing the law—that is, by
determining how the legislature that passed the law would have resolved this kind of case, had it been
put?”).
295. See id. at 544 (“My suggestion is that unless the statute plainly hands courts the power to
create and revise common law, the domain of the statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by
its framers . . . .”).
296. One recent empirical study measuring factors that contributed to the Supreme Court’s use of
legislative history from 1953 to 2006 has begun down this path, finding that the level of ideological
alignment between the authoring Justice and the Congress that enacted a statute is a statistically
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Conclusion
This Article’s empirical and doctrinal analysis of the Roberts
Court’s 2005–2008 Terms’ statutory cases confirms what prior studies of
the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation methods have shown—that
the Court’s actual approach to construing statutes defies the traditional
lines scholars have drawn between textualism and intentionalism.
Contrary to the conclusions reached by prior empirical studies, however,
the data and doctrinal analysis in this Article also suggest that there is
something more than pure eclecticism at work in the Justices’ reliance on
particular interpretive tools. I have argued that that something more is a
focus on ensuring coherence in the law, coupled with a philosophical
dissonance over what form of coherence is most important: coherence in
the external legal landscape or coherence in the internal, specific policy
of the individual statute. The Justices’ interpretive divide over landscape
versus statute-specific coherence, I submit, gives theoretical context to
much of what the Court is saying between the lines in its statutory cases
and clarifies how both the majority and dissent in the same case can take
a judge-as-guardian-of-coherence approach to interpreting a statute,
while reaching opposing constructions. In pointing out the Justices’
coherence divide, I do not mean to suggest that it is the only, or even the
most important, factor at work in the Roberts Court’s statutory cases.
Rather, my aim in this Article has been to illuminate an overlooked, but
significant, philosophical point of departure underlying the Justices’
differing preferences for particular interpretive tools and, in so doing,
perhaps to provide a theoretical alternative to the aging debate between
textualism and intentionalism.

significant predictor of the probability that a given statutory interpretation opinion will reference
legislative history. See Law & Zaring, supra note 6.
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Appendix of Tables
Table 6a: Practical Consequence References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Practical
Consequences

Number of Opinions
Referencing Practical
Consequences

45.3%

24/53

Environmental
statutes

25%

6/24

Jurisdictional statutes

28%

14/50

36.4%

4/11

42.9%

21/49

Civil RICO

22.2%

2/9

Securities statutes

22.2%

2/9

Preemption statutes

36.4%

8/22

Immigration statutes

23.1%

3/13

30%

3/10

Subject Matter

Criminal statutes

Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA

Krishnakumar_62-HLJ-221.doc (Do Not Delete)

December 2010]

1/13/2011 10:43 AM

ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST ERA

281

Table 6b: Supreme Court Precedent References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Supreme Court
Precedent

Number of Opinions
Referencing Supreme
Court Precedent

26.4%

14/53

Environmental
statutes

25%

6/24

Jurisdictional statutes

66%

33/50

63.6%

7/11

61.2%

30/49

Civil RICO

66.7%

6/9

Securities statutes

33.3%

3/9

Preemption statutes

68.2%

15/22

Immigration statutes

38.5%

5/13

40%

4/10

61.2%

30/49

Subject Matter

Criminal statutes

Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA
Discrimination
statutes
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Table 6c: Whole Act Rule References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
the Whole Act Rule

Number of Opinions
Referencing the
Whole Act Rule

34%

18/53

29.2%

7/24

24%

12/50

45.5%

5/11

24.5%

12/49

Civil RICO

11.1%

1/9

Securities statutes

11.1%

1/9

Preemption statutes

27.3%

6/22

Immigration statutes

38.5%

5/13

20%

2/10

Subject Matter
Criminal statutes
Environmental
statutes
Jurisdictional statutes
Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA
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Table 6d: Text/Plain Meaning References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Text/Plain Meaning

Number of Opinions
Referencing
Text/Plain Meaning

Criminal statutes

54.7%

29/53

Environmental
statutes

58.3%

14/24

36%

18/50

36.4%

4/11

38.8%

19/49

Civil RICO

66.7%

6/9

Securities statutes

33.3%

3/9

Preemption statutes

45.5%

10/22

Immigration statutes

46.2%

6/13

20%

2/10

Subject Matter

Jurisdictional statutes
Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA
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Table 7a: Other Statutes References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Other Statutes

Number of Opinions
Referencing Other
Statutes

Criminal statutes

39.6%

21/53

Environmental
statutes

4.2%

1/24

Jurisdictional statutes

22%

11/50

18.2%

2/11

20.4%

10/49

Civil RICO

33.3%

3/9

Securities statutes

22.2%

2/9

Preemption statutes

22.7%

5/22

Immigration statutes

30.8%

4/13

0%

0/10

Subject Matter

Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA
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Table 7b: Dictionary References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Dictionaries

Number of Opinions
Referencing
Dictionaries

Criminal statutes

26.4%

14/53

Environmental
statutes

41.7%

10/24

12%

6/50

0%

0/11

10.2%

5/49

Civil RICO

22.2%

2/9

Securities statutes

11.1%

1/9

Preemption statutes

9.1%

2/22

Immigration statutes

23.1%

3/13

20%

2/10

Subject Matter

Jurisdictional statutes
Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA
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Table 7c: Common Law Precedent References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Common Law

Number of Opinions
Referencing Common
Law

Criminal statutes

7.5%

4/53

Environmental
statutes

4.2%

1/24

6%

3/50

0%

0/11

6.1%

3/49

Civil RICO

22.2%

2/9

Securities statutes

22.2%

2/9

Preemption statutes

9.1%

2/22

Immigration statutes

23.1%

3/13

30%

3/10

Subject Matter

Jurisdictional statutes
Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA
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Table 7d: Substantive Canon References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Substantive Canons

Number of Opinions
Referencing
Substantive Canons

Criminal statutes

17%

9/53

Environmental
statutes

8.3%

2/24

8%

4/50

9.1%

1/11

14.3%

7/49

Civil RICO

11.1%

1/9

Securities statutes

11.1%

1/9

Preemption statutes

22.7%

5/22

Immigration statutes

7.7%

1/13

0%

0/10

Subject Matter

Jurisdictional statutes
Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA
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Table 8a: Legislative History References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Legislative History

Number of Opinions
Referencing
Legislative History

Criminal statutes

30.2%

16/53

Environmental
statutes

20.8%

5/24

20%

10/50

9.1%

1/11

30.6%

15/49

Civil RICO

22.2%

2/9

Securities statutes

33.3%

3/9

Preemption statutes

18.2%

4/22

Immigration statutes

7.7%

1/13

0%

0/10

Subject Matter

Jurisdictional statutes
Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA
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Table 8b: Intent References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Intent

Number of Opinions
Referencing Intent

Criminal statutes

24.5%

13/53

Environmental
statutes

20.8%

5/24

14%

7/50

9.1%

1/11

22.4%

11/49

Civil RICO

11.1%

1/9

Securities statutes

33.3%

3/9

Preemption statutes

31.8%

7/22

Immigration statutes

7.7%

1/13

ERISA

10%

1/10

Subject Matter

Jurisdictional statutes
Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes
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Table 8c: Purpose References by Statute Type
Percentage of
Opinions Referencing
Purpose

Number of Opinions
Referencing Purpose

17%

9/53

37.5%

9/24

24%

12/50

18.2%

2/11

20.4%

10/49

Civil RICO

22.2%

2/9

Securities statutes

44.4%

4/9

Preemption statutes

40.9%

9/22

Immigration statutes

30.8%

4/13

10%

1/10

Subject Matter
Criminal statutes
Environmental
statutes
Jurisdictional statutes
Federal Arbitration
Act
Discrimination
statutes

ERISA
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Codebook
Note: For all of these canons/tools of interpretation, opinions should
NOT be marked as utilizing the canon/tool if it mentions the canon as an
argument raised by a party but then rejects/declines to rely on that canon
in the case. For example, coders should not count the case as one which
utilizes the Dictionary Rule if the Court mentions a definition given by a
dictionary but rejects it as inaccurate or not reflecting common usage;
nor should they count the case as one in which the Court engages in
Agency Deference if the Court discusses the agency’s interpretation but
rejects it and goes on to interpret the statute differently.
AdditionalInfo = A variable recording additional legislative history
information. Code “1” if the opinion is one in which Justice Scalia
refused to join because of its legislative history use. Code “2” if the
opinion is one that relies on the evolution of the statute, rather than on
committee reports, floor debates, or other internal legislative records
about the process of statutory enactment. Code “3” if the opinion is one
that references both the evolution of the statute and internal legislative
records. Code “4” if the opinion is one that references or draws
inferences based on legislative inaction. Code “0” if the opinion does not
fit one of the above special cases.
Agencysimp = Code “1” if the opinion defers to the relevant agency’s
interpretation of the statute. Code “0” if the opinion does not mention or
if it rejects/goes against the agency’s interpretation of the statute.
Author = Name of the Justice who authored the opinion being coded.
Code “0” for per curiam opinions; “1” for opinions authored by Justice
Scalia; “2” for opinions authored by Justice Thomas; “3” for opinions
authored by Chief Justice Roberts; “4” for opinions authored by Justice
Alito; “5” for opinions authored by Justice Kennedy; “6” for opinions
authored by Justice Souter; “7” for opinions authored by Justice
Ginsburg; “8” for opinions authored by Justice Breyer; and “9” for
opinions authored by Justice Stevens.
Case Name = Name of case.
Case Term = Supreme Court Term during which the case was argued.
Common Law Precedent = Code “1” if the opinion references common
law precedent or analogizes to common practice in the same or another
area of law (for example, “failure to exhaust is treated X way in the
administrative law and criminal law contexts”). Code “0” if no reference
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is made to common law precedents or practices, or if the opinion
considers but rejects such precedents or practices.
Dictionary Rule = Code “1” if the opinion cites and references one or
more dictionary definitions; note the dictionary(ies) cited. Code “0” if
the opinion does not reference a dictionary or if it considers and rejects a
dictionary definition.
Docket Number = The Supreme Court’s docket number for the case.
Grammar Canons = Code “1” if the opinion references one or more
grammar rules. Code “0” if the opinion does not reference grammatical
rules or rejects their use.
Ideology = Imported Spaeth database coding for ideological outcome of
the opinion. “1” denotes a conservative opinion outcome, “2” denotes a
liberal opinion outcome, “0” denotes an indeterminate ideological
outcome.
Intent = Code “1” if the opinion references Congress’s intent or
presumed intent. Code “0” if the opinion does not reference legislative
intent or rejects reliance on legislative intent.
Landscape v. Statute-Specific = A group variable allowing for
comparisons between the landscape- and statute-specific Justices taken
together. Code “1” if the opinion was authored by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Roberts, Alito, or Kennedy. Code “2” if the opinion was
authored by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, or Stevens. Code “0” if
the opinion was a per curiam one.
Langgram = Code “1” if the opinion references either grammar canons
or linguistic canons, or both. Code “0” if it does not. (If the opinion was
coded “1” for either grammar or linguistic canon use, then it should be
coded “1” for this variable as well).
LanGRWA = Code “1” for opinions that reference any one or more of
the following: language canons, grammar rules, and/or the whole act rule.
Code “0” for opinions that do not reference any of these interpretive
tools.
Language Canon = Code “1” if the opinion references linguistic canons
such as ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis, expressio unius, or other word
association canons. Code “0” if it does not or if it rejects linguistic canon
arguments.
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Leghistsimp = Code “1” if the opinion references legislative history
documents or references the evolution of the statutory provision at issue.
Code “0” if the opinion does not reference legislative history.
Legislative History = Code “1” if the opinion uses legislative history to
corroborate an interpretation dictated by other tools or canons or if the
opinion actively references the legislative history to reach its result.
Specify the kind and source(s) of legislative history cited. Code “0” if the
opinion does not reference legislative history or rejects legislative history
use.
Legislative Purpose = Code “1” if the opinion references the statute’s
purpose or goals. Code “0” if the opinion does not reference the statute’s
purpose or goals or if it rejects arguments based on the statute’s purpose
or goals.
Margin = Code “0” for unanimous cases, “1” for 5-3 or 5-4 margin cases,
“2” for wide margin cases with 6 or more justices voting in the majority,
“3” for cases decided by a plurality of 4-1-4.
Marginsh = Stands for marginshare, a simplification of the “margin”
variable. Code “0” for unanimous cases, “1” for close margin cases
decided 5-3/5-4 or 4-1-4 (i.e., cases where there are fewer than 6 justices
joining the majority), “3” for wide margin cases with 6 or more justices
joining the majority.
Martype = A simplified variable that does not distinguish between close
margin and wide margin cases. Code “0” for unanimous cases, “1” for
divided vote cases.
Opinion = Code “1” for majority opinions, “2” for concurrences, “3” for
dissenting opinions, “4” for partially concurring/partially dissenting
opinions, “5” for part majority/part concurring opinions, “6” for plurality
opinions.
Other Statutes = Code “1” if the opinion references other statutes (any
reliance on other statutes, whether state or federal). Code “0” if the
opinion does not reference other statutes or rejects analogies to other
statutes.
Practical Consequences = Code “1” if the opinion references the practical
consequences that would follow from a particular interpretation or
outcome in reaching its construction of the statute, including references
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to the absurdity doctrine, the practical difficulty of administering the rule
created by the interpretation, the justness or fairness of an interpretation,
the interpretation’s predicted effect on judicial or other government
institutions’ resources, the interpretation’s effect on the clarity or
predictability of the legal rule in the relevant area of the law, and the
interpretation’s consistency with the policy of the statute. Code “0” if the
opinion does not reference the practical consequences that would flow
from a particular interpretation, or if the opinion rejects arguments
based on practical consequences.
Practical Type = Code “1” for opinions that reference practical
consequences that focus on the administrability of an interpretation—
that is, opinions that discuss the practical difficulty of administering the
rule created by the interpretation, the interpretation’s predicted effect on
judicial or other government institutions’ resources, or the
interpretation’s effect on the clarity or predictability of the legal rule in
the relevant area of the law. Code “2” for opinions that reference
practical consequences that focus on the internal statutory consistency or
the constancy of the policy created by the interpretation—that is,
opinions that reference absurdities created by an interpretation, the
justness or fairness of an interpretation, or the interpretation’s
consistency with the underlying policy of the statute. Code “3” for
opinions that reference both administrability and consistency-type
practical consequence concerns. Code “0” for opinions that make no
reference to the practical consequences of an interpretation.
Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Alito, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer,
Stevens = Each Justice’s name is a separate variable coded for agreement
in the case. Code “0” for Author Majority; “1” for Joined
Majority/Plurality; “2” for Joined Concurrence; “3” for Joined Dissent;
“4” for Joined Majority and Concurrence; “5” for Not Participating; “6”
for Authored Concurrence; “7” for Authored Dissent; “8” for Authored
Dissent & Joined a Dissent; “9” for Authored Concurrence + Joined
Majority; “10” for Joined 2 Dissents; “11” for Authored a
Concurrence/Dissent; “12” for Authored a Concurrence + Joined a
Concurrence; “13” for Authored Concurrence + Partially Joined a
Dissent; “14” for Concurrence + Partially joined Majority; “15” for
Authored Concurrence/Dissent + Partially Joined Majority; “16” for
Joined a Part Concurrence/Part Dissent; “17” for Authored
Concurrence/Dissent + Joined Dissent; “18” for Partially Joined
Majority + Joined a Concurrence/Dissent; “19” for Partially Joined
Majority + Joined a Concurrence/Dissent + Authored a Concurrence/
Dissent; “20” for Partially Joined Majority; “21” for voted to grant a writ.
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Subject Area = Statute or field of law of statute being interpreted. Code
“1” for criminal statutes; “2” for environmental statutes; “3” for
jurisdictional statutes; “4” for the Internal Revenue Code; “5” for the
Federal Arbitration Act; “6” for discrimination-related statutes; “7” for
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); “8” for civil
RICO; “9” for securities statutes; “10” for antitrust statutes; “11” for
preemption statutes; “12” for the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA); “13”
for the Bankruptcy Code; “14” for immigration statutes; “15” for
ERISA; “16” for the Federal Communications Act; “17” for the Prison
Litigation Reform Act; “18” for the Patent Act; “19” for the False
Claims Act; “20” for the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA); “21” for the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA);
and “22” for other statutes.
Substantive Canons = Code “1” if the opinion references a substantive
canon – i.e., a background constitutional or policy norm or a rule about
how a particular kind of statute is to be construed. Specify which
substantive canon is being used. Code “0” if no substantive canon is
referenced or if the opinion rejects a substantive canon as inapplicable.
Supreme Court Precedent = Code “1” if the opinion references prior case
law (Supreme Court opinions) interpreting the same statute or
interpreting the same or similar words in a different statute. Code “0” if
the opinion does not reference prior Supreme Court case law to interpret
the statute.
Text/Plain Meaning = Code “1” if the opinion references the
clear/plain/ordinary/natural meaning, usage of a word, or the
text/language of a statute in construing a word or phrase in the statute.
Does not count mere quotation of statutory language at issue without
more, and does not count comments that the text is ambiguous. Code “0”
if no mention is made of statutory text or plain meaning, or if the opinion
merely comments that the text is ambiguous.
Whole Act Rule = Code “1” if the opinion references different parts of
the statute at issue to determine the meaning of the provision/words at
issue (common variants include the rule against derogation, meaning that
different parts of a single statute must be consistent in their policy
implications, and that one part of a statute should not be interpreted in a
manner that derogates or undermines another part; the rule of
meaningful variation, which dictates that if one part of the statute says X,
and another similar part omits X, the difference is assumed to be
intentional and to require a different interpretation; the rule against
superfluity, which dictates that one part of a statute should not be
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interpreted in a manner that renders another part of the same statute
redundant or superfluous, and so on). Code “0” if the opinion does not
reference the whole act rule or if it considers and rejects whole act rule
arguments.

